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1. Abstract 
This thesis analyses in detail two models of international trade featuring monopolistic 
competition and increasing returns. The first model is a standard Krugman model, 
while the other is my adaptation of a model due to Thomas Chaney (2008). Both 
models include one homogeneous industry, with constant returns and perfect 
competition, in addition to one differentiated sector with increasing returns. The 
models build on the Dixit-Stiglitz framework, and in my version both have only two 
countries. 
The difference between the models is that Chaney introduces heterogeneous 
productivity in the differentiated sector, and has a system of fixed costs for entry into 
each market. Thus a firm may well compete in one market but not in the other.  
This new specification of the model leads to interesting findings. Chaney himself 
analyses the consequences for gravity. I follow this up by investigating how his 
findings carry over to the two country case. My findings are that his results hold also 
in this case. For the n-country case, the Krugman model implies that the elasticity of 
substitution (σ) affects the elasticity of trade flows with respect to variable trade costs 
(ς) positively. Chaney finds that this effect is absent in his model. On the contrary, the 
elasticity of trade flows with respect to fixed trade costs (ξ) is affected negatively by 
σ. Thus the sum of this is that trade flows are affected negatively by σ, not positively 
as Krugman’s model implies. 
In the two-country case, the results are stronger. Here the Krugman model implies a 
positive relationship between σ and ς  while the Chaney-model implies a negative. In 
addition, the effect on ξ is negative, and more so than in the n-country case. 
My next results come from analysing the home market effect (HME) in the model. I 
find that the effect is present, but is graphically visible only for the right parameter 
values. It thus seems to be rather week. The result I obtain is a non-linear relationship 
between the share of labour force and the share of production. In the case of 
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symmetric costs and equal wages, the smaller country will produce a somewhat less 
than proportional share of the differentiated good.  
The non-linear shape still ensures that we never get full specialisation. The smallest 
countries will always produce some of the differentiated good. This is caused by the 
productivity structure: there will always be a few firms productive enough to 
overcome the disadvantages of being located in the smaller market. 
Finally, I analyse the impact of a change in country size on the ideal price indices. As 
income per capita is constant, the impact on the price index can be seen as a proxy for 
the impact on utility. I derive how the gains from trade (as measured by the price 
index) depend on the size of the partner one trades with. 
For the Krugman model I find that a country benefits from getting bigger. Somewhat 
surprisingly I find that if a homogeneous good is also traded, it matters not for a 
country whether the trading partner is small or large. For the Chaney model the 
results are less clear, but a combination of algebra and numerical analysis using 
MATLAB indicates that a country gains from getting bigger, and that it also gains 
from having a larger trading partner. The results are not entirely clear on which 
country benefits the most in absolute terms, but it seems clear that the growing 
country will a larger percentagewise reduction in the price index. 
 
 
 9 
2. Introduction 
The Home Market Effect (HME) is a well documentet phenomena that countries tend 
to export goods that they have a relatively large demand of. An alternative 
formulation that will be more relevant for this thesis is that everything else equal the 
larger (of two) country will be responsible for a larger than proportional share of 
world production of increasing return goods. This is contrary to traditional trade 
models where countries specialise according the comparative advantage, but finds 
theoretical support in the works of among others Paul Krugman. The specific source I 
will use for this model is section 10.4 in Helpman and Krugman (1985). 
By only changing the model in one point: introducing trade cost also on the 
homogeneous good, Davis (1998) shows that the HME disappears entirely, unless 
differences in trade costs are large. It has subsequently been shown (Holmes, Stevens, 
2002) that the results can be re-obtained by leaving the two-sector case and 
introducing a range of industries differentiated by the degree of scale economies. To 
do this they are forced to step out of the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic 
competition. They call this to breathe new life into Krugman’s original findings, but I 
cannot see that much is left of the Krugman model at all.  
 Feenstra, Markusen and Rose (1998) show that the HME can also be found in a 
model with homogeneous goods with restricted entry. All in all, it seems that the 
HME is a general phenomenon in the theory, but that it rests heavily on a range of 
parameters. 
In this thesis I will not deviate as much from the Krugman framework as those above. 
I will follow the model of Thomas Chaney (2008) where he introduces heterogeneous 
productivity and a new system of fixed costs, where each firm must pay a fixed cost 
for entry into each market.  
The structure of the thesis is as follows. In chapter 3 I go through the Krugman 
framework that I will use for comparison. This section builds on Krugman 1980 and 
Helpman/Krugman 1985. I deviate somewhat in the structure of their presentation 
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and show more derivations than they do. This does not contain much of an 
independent contribution. In chapter 4 I turn to Chaney’s model. I go through the 
derivations of his model step by step, and again, show more derivations. Chaney is 
concerned with the gravity effect. In chapters 5, 6 and 7 my independent 
contributions can be found. 
1) In chapter 5 I present Chaney’s finding on the gravity properties of the model. 
I translate the results into a two-country case for better comparison to 
Helpman/Krugman’s results. 
 
2) In chapter 6 I investigate whether the home market effect exists in the Chaney 
model and if so, how the effect deviates from Krugman’s result. 
 
3) In chapter 7 I look at the affect of a change in relative size of countries on the 
ideal price indices of the two countries, and compare that to what can be 
derived for the Krugman framework. I compare two models with exogenous 
wages which means that this investigation is really an investigation of the 
gains from trade and how this is dependent on relative size. 
I focus a lot on relative size in this thesis. When I study the impact of a change in 
relative size or a growth in the size of one country, that is not because I am interested 
in the dynamics of growth in itself. It is just a way of expressing that I change the 
assumptions about relative size to see how this affects the results. 
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3. The Krugman Framework 
3.1 Deriving the basics 
In this section I will present a basic model of trade in differentiated goods. The basic 
framework of monopolistic competition and economies of scale in the first part is 
more or less taken from Krugman (1980), and the second part that is specifically on 
the home market effect (HME) is taken from Helpman/Krugman (H/K) (1985). The 
first of these sections can be taken lightly on, but some references to this section will 
come later. It is the section on the home market effect that will be the foundation for 
most of the comparison.   
I have changed a little from their setup and I have chosen to present it in a notation 
closer to that in the article by Thomas Chaney. This notation is easier to adapt to a 
multi-country case or other generalisations. 
This world consists of two countries where productivity is homogeneous. Countries 
only differ in size, measured in labour available. The model has one factor of 
production: labour L. 
The representative consumers’ utility is given by: 
𝑢 =  𝑐𝑖
(𝜍−1) 𝜍 
𝑖
, 1 < 𝜍                                                                                (1)  
with budget constraint  𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖 ≤ 𝑤𝑖 . 𝜍 denotes the elasticity of substitution between 
varieties. This is identical for both countries. We have a production function with one 
factor of production: 
𝑙𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖 , 𝛼,𝛽 > 0, 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛                                                                 (2) 
Output equals demand:  
𝑥𝑖 = 𝐿𝐾𝑐𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛                                                                                        (3) 
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Where 𝐿𝐾 means population in country K. 
Full employment condition: 
𝐿𝐾 =  (𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖)
𝑛𝐾
𝑖=1
 , 𝐾 = 𝐻, 𝐹                                                                           (4) 
The optimisation problem gives the Lagrangian: 
ℒ =  𝑐𝑖
(𝜍−1) 𝜍 
𝑖
− 𝜆  𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖 − 𝑤
𝑖
  
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑐𝑖
=
𝜍 − 1
𝜍
𝑐𝑖
−1 𝜍 −  𝜆𝑝𝑖 →
𝜍 − 1
𝜍
𝑐𝑖
−1 𝜍 = 𝜆𝑝𝑖  ,        𝑖 = 1,… . ,𝑛     (5) 
(In the Lagrangian above, we have replaced utility with a strictly increasing 
transformation that will yield the same results.) 
We solve (5) for 𝑐𝑖  
𝑐𝑖 =  
𝜆𝑝𝑖𝜍
𝜍 − 1
 
−𝜍
 
We go through the same procedure for a second variety j, and divide the one by the 
other: 
𝑐𝑖
𝑐𝑗
=  
𝑝𝑖
𝑝𝑗
 
−𝜍
 
multiplying both sides by 𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑗  and summing over i on both sides 
 𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖
𝑖
= 𝑝𝑗
𝜍𝑐𝑗  𝑝𝑖
1−𝜍
𝑖
 
Now the left hand side is equal to income w. To get the (Marshallian) demand 
function we must isolate 𝑐𝑗  and at last define the price index for country K as 
 13 
P ≡   𝑝𝑖
1−𝜍
𝑖
 
1
1−𝜍
 
to get 
𝑐𝑗 =
𝑝𝑗
−𝜍
P1−𝜍
𝑤 
On the aggregate where supply equals demand: 
𝑥𝑖 = 𝐿𝐾𝑐𝑗 =
𝑝𝑗
−𝜍
P1−𝜍
𝑤𝐿𝐾                                                                                     (6) 
Assuming that there is a considerable number of firms, the price of an individual 
good does not affect the marginal utility of income. The elasticity of substitution is 
therefore −
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑝 𝑖
𝑝 𝑖
𝑥𝑖
= 𝜍  
Krugman utilises the approach of Chamberlinian imperfect competition: Firms 
maximise profits, free entry drives profits to zero (assuming 𝛼 > 0). Optimal price 
for the firms will be a constant markup over marginal cost, just covering fixed costs: 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑖 −  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖 𝑤,      𝑖 = 1,… . ,𝑛                                                               (7) 
𝑝𝑖 =
𝜍
𝜍 − 1
𝛽𝑤,               𝑖 = 1, … . , 𝑛                                                                        (8) 
As σ, β and w are common to all firms, p and 𝜋 are also the same. We can skip the 
subscript denoting firm. 
We use the zero profit assumption 𝜋 = 0 and solve for 𝑥𝑖 : 
𝑥𝑖 =
𝛼𝑤
𝑝 − 𝛽𝑤
 
We solve (7) for w and insert it above to get  
𝑥𝑖 =
𝛼 𝜍 − 1 
𝛽
,      𝑖 = 1,… . ,𝑛                                                                              (9) 
14 
 
which is independent of the size of the country, and therefore equal to all countries. It 
is also independent of trade. Trade therefore realises no gains due to scale of 
production. We can see that as α, β and θ are equal to all firms, we can also on x skip 
subscript.  
The number of varieties produced can be determined from full employment condition 
(4) and (9). 
𝐿𝐾 = 𝑛𝐾(𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥) , 𝐾 = 𝐻,𝐹  
Solving for 𝑛𝐾 and simplifying 
𝑛𝐾 =
𝐿𝐾
𝜍𝛼
, 𝐾 = 𝐻, 𝐹                                                                                            (10) 
where 𝑛𝐾 is the number of varieties produced in country K. This is independent of 
trade. We see that that in this model gains from trade only comes through one 
channel: an increase in available goods for consumers. Even with unchanged real 
wages w/p, we have an increase in utility.
1
 
3.2 Trade flows 
Individuals in country H will spend a fraction 
𝑛𝐹
𝑛𝐻 +𝑛𝐹
 on foreign goods. Foreigners will 
spend 
𝑛𝐻
𝑛𝐻 +𝑛𝐹
  on home goods. The value of home country imports measured in wage 
units is 𝐿𝐻
𝑛𝐹
𝑛𝐻 +𝑛𝐹
 which we from (10) can see equals 
𝐿𝐻𝐿𝐹
𝐿𝐻+𝐿𝐹
. We get the same result 
when finding the value of foreign country imports, which implies trade balance. 
We have seen that the volume of trade is determinate, but the direction is 
indeterminate. 
 
                                              
1 A short note that shows this is included as the appendix gains from variety 
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3.3 Transport costs 
We now introduce transport costs of the iceberg type. Of the shipped goods, only a 
fraction g arrives, 1 – g is lost in transit. There are no other costs attached to the 
involvement to trade than this variable unit cost. 
With the introduction of trade costs, identical prices across countries are no longer 
guaranteed. We now introduce different prices across countries: 
- In country H, home goods (𝑛𝐻 varieties) are sold at f.o.b. price 𝑝𝐻 . 
- In country F, foreign goods (𝑛𝐹 varieties) are sold at f.o.b. price 𝑝𝐹. 
- Foreign goods are sold in H at c.i.f. price 𝑝𝐹𝐻 =
𝑝𝐹
𝑔
. 
- Home goods are sold in F at c.i.f. price 𝑝𝐻𝐹 =
𝑝𝐻
𝑔
. 
We now get that consumers will consume unequal amounts of the goods. It can be 
shown by maximising H-consumers’ utility with respect to H-goods and F-goods, 
dividing the one by the other and solving for the consumption of F-good 𝑐𝐹𝐻  that 
𝑐𝐹𝐻 =  
𝑝𝐻
𝑝𝐹𝐻
 
𝜍
𝑐𝐻 , where 𝑐𝐻  is the individual consumption of a single variety of an H-
good in country H. 
Due to the transport costs, one unit of an imported good consumed, means that 1/g 
units must be produced. 
I define a variable θK  as the ratio of total demand (reaching producer) by K-residents 
for each imported variety to demand for each local variety. We must take account of 
the goods lost in transport. 
θ K =
1
g
𝑐𝐿𝐾
𝑐𝐾
 , 𝐾, 𝐿 = 𝐻, 𝐹                                                                              (11) 
Inserting for 𝑐𝐹𝐻  and  𝑐𝐻𝐹  from above: 
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θH =
1
g
 
𝑝𝐻
𝑝𝐹𝐻
 
𝜍
=
1
g
 
𝑝𝐻
𝑝𝐹 𝑔 
 
𝜍
=  
𝑝𝐻
𝑝𝐹
 
𝜍
𝑔𝜍−1  
θF =
1
g
 
𝑝𝐹
𝑝𝐻𝐹
 
𝜍
=
1
g
 
𝑝𝐹
𝑝𝐻 𝑔 
 
𝜍
=  
𝑝𝐻
𝑝𝐹
 
−𝜍
𝑔𝜍−1                                              (12) 
We know that spending must be equal to wages (which are now allowed to differ 
between countries). For country K we have the condition  𝑛𝐾𝑝𝐾 + θK𝑛𝐿𝑝𝐿 𝑐𝐾 = 𝑤𝐾. 
We can also find the elasticity of export demand and domestic demand facing each 
firm: 
𝑐𝐾𝐿 =  
𝑝𝐿
𝑝𝐾𝐿
 
𝜍
𝑐𝐿 = 𝑔
𝜍  
𝑝𝐿
𝑝𝐾
 
𝜍
𝑐𝐿  , 𝐾, 𝐿 = 𝐻,𝐹 
−
𝜕𝑐𝐾
𝜕𝑝𝐾
𝑝𝐾
𝑐𝐾
= 𝜍 
−
𝜕𝑐𝐾𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐾
𝑝𝐾
𝑐𝐾𝐿
= 𝜍 
The elasticity facing a given firm is the same, whether it comes from abroad or the 
same country. We bring back (7) and (10) 
𝑝𝐾 =
𝜍
𝜍 − 1
𝛽𝑤𝐾 ,               𝑖 = 1, … . , 𝑛 
𝑛𝐾 =
𝐿𝐾
𝜍𝛼
, 𝐾 = 𝐻, 𝐹                                                                                            (13) 
As can be seen from (13), prices can only differ if wages differ, something they are 
now (with transport costs) allowed to do. Prices relative to wages are constant. The 
number of varieties produced is unchanged, trade or not, trade costs or not. The only 
thing that can change is relative wages 
𝑤𝐻
𝑤𝐹
= 𝜔. 
This is the framework we need. we will do certain changes when we go to the next 
subsection, but the changes are rather trivial, and we do not have to derive everything 
again. 
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3.4 Home Market Effects on the Pattern of Trade 
Krugman’s main result is that countries will tend to specialise in production of goods 
that they have a relatively large demand of. In this section I will leave the 1980 article 
and more or less follow the model in section 10.4 of Helpman and Krugman (1985) 
(may be referred to as H/K from now). 
We let 𝑐0 denote the consumption of the homogeneous good. Utility is now given by: 
𝑈 = 𝑐0
1−𝜇   𝑐𝑖
(𝜍−1) 𝜍 
+
𝑛𝐻
𝑖=1
 𝑐𝑗
(𝜍−1) 𝜍 
𝑛𝐹
𝑗 =1
 
𝜍𝜇
𝜍−1
, 1 < 𝜍, 0 < 𝜇 < 1           (14𝑎) 
subject to the budget for H: 
𝑝0𝑐0 +  𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖
𝑛𝐻
𝑖=1
+  𝜏𝑝𝑗
𝑛𝐹
𝑗=1
𝑐𝑗 ≤ 𝑤                                                                (15𝑎) 
budget for F: 
𝑝0𝑐0 +  𝜏𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖
𝑛𝐻
𝑖=1
+  𝑝𝑗
𝑛𝐹
𝑗 =1
𝑐𝑗 ≤ 𝑤                                                                (15𝑎) 
Where τ denotes transport costs between the countries. Costs are assumed identical in 
both directions. Transport costs are of the iceberg type. If one unit of good is to be 
imported, τ units must be exported from the other country. 
Wages are identical in both countries. This is because we assume both countries 
produce the homogeneous good with the same technology and, most crucially, the 
homogeneous good is assumed free of trade costs. 
This means all prices f.o.b. are the same, as given by (7),  𝑝𝐻 = 𝑝𝐹 = 𝑝. I will still 
keep the subscripts for now. 
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We simplify the utility function and the constraints as we have symmetry between 
varieties: 
𝑈 = 𝑐0
1−𝜇  𝑛𝐻𝑐𝐻
(𝜍−1) 𝜍 
+ 𝑛𝐹𝑐𝐹𝐻
(𝜍−1) 𝜍 
 
𝜍𝜇
𝜍−1 , 1 < 𝜍                                             (14𝑏) 
subject to the budget for H: 
𝑝0𝑐0 + 𝑛𝐻𝑝𝐻𝑐𝐻 + 𝑛𝐹𝜏𝑝𝐹𝑐𝐹 ≤ 𝑤                                                                                 (15𝑏) 
budget for F: 
𝑝0𝑐0 + 𝑛𝐻𝜏𝑝𝐻𝑐𝐻 + 𝑛𝐹𝑝𝐹𝑐𝐹 ≤ 𝑤                                                                                (15𝑏) 
As we are mostly interested in the differentiated good, and a constant share of income 
will be spent on homogeneous goods, we can alternatively express the budget 
constraints as 
𝑛𝐻𝑝𝐻𝑐𝐻 + 𝑛𝐹𝜏𝑝𝐹𝑐𝐹𝐻 ≤ 𝜇𝑤                                                                                       (15𝑐) 
𝑛𝐻𝜏𝑝𝐻𝑐𝐻𝐹 + 𝑛𝐹𝑝𝐹𝑐𝐹 ≤ 𝜇𝑤                                                                                       (15𝑐) 
Due to CD-utility 𝑐0 can easily be found as 𝑐0 =  1 − 𝜇 
𝑤
𝑝0
 
Given this, we can consider 𝑐0 to be exogenous to the sub-optimisation between 
imported and domestically produced goods, and use the constraints in (15c) 
For country H we get the Lagrangian 
ℒ𝐻 = 𝑐0
1−𝜇  𝑛𝐻𝑐𝐻
(𝜍−1) 𝜍 
+ 𝑛𝐹𝑐𝐹𝐻
(𝜍−1) 𝜍 
 
𝜍𝜇
𝜍−1 − 𝜆 𝑛𝐻𝑝𝐻𝑐𝐻 + 𝑛𝐹𝜏𝑝𝐹𝑐𝐹 ≤ −𝜇𝑤  
𝜕ℒ𝐻
𝜕𝑐𝐻
= 𝑐0
1−𝜇
𝜍𝜇
𝜍 − 1
 𝑛𝐻𝑐𝐻
(𝜍−1) 𝜍 
+ 𝑛𝐹𝑐𝐹𝐻
(𝜍−1) 𝜍 
 
𝜍𝜇
𝜍−1−1
×
𝜍 − 1
𝜍
𝑛𝐻𝑐𝐻
−1 𝜍 
− 𝜆𝑛𝐻𝑝𝐻 = 0 
𝜕ℒ𝐻
𝜕𝑐𝐹
= 𝑐0
1−𝜇
𝜍𝜇
𝜍 − 1
 𝑛𝐻𝑐𝐻
(𝜍−1) 𝜍 
+ 𝑛𝐹𝑐𝐹𝐻
(𝜍−1) 𝜍 
 
𝜍𝜇
𝜍−1−1
×
𝜍 − 1
𝜍
𝑛𝐹𝑐𝐹𝐻
−1 𝜍 
− 𝜆𝑛𝐹𝜏𝑝𝐹 = 0 
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We move the last part of each of these to the other side, and divide the first condition 
by the last. We get 
𝑛𝐻𝑐𝐻
−1 𝜍 
𝑛𝐹𝑐𝐹𝐻
−1 𝜍 
=
𝑛𝐻𝑝𝐻
𝑛𝐹𝜏𝑝𝐹
 
𝑐𝐻
𝑐𝐹𝐻
=  
𝑝𝐻
𝜏𝑝𝐹
 
−𝜍
                                                                                                                   (16) 
Solving the budget constraint for 𝑐𝐹𝐻  and inserting above gives 
𝑐𝐻
𝜇𝑤 − 𝑛𝐻𝑝𝐻𝑐𝐻
𝑛𝐹𝜏𝑝𝐹
=  
𝑝𝐻
𝜏𝑝𝐹
 
−𝜍
 
𝑐𝐻 =
𝑝𝐻
−𝜍
𝑛𝐻𝑝𝐻
1−𝜍 + 𝑛𝐹 𝜏𝑝𝐹 
1−𝜍
𝜇𝑤 
Moving back to (16) and instead inserting for 𝑐𝐻  from the budget we can find 𝑐𝐹𝐻  
𝑐𝐹𝐻 =
 𝜏𝑝𝐹 
−𝜍
𝑛𝐻𝑝𝐻
1−𝜍 + 𝑛𝐹 𝜏𝑝𝐹 
1−𝜍
𝜇𝑤 
Aggregated for the home country, we get the demand functions 
𝐶𝐻 =
𝑝𝐻
−𝜍
𝑛𝐻𝑝𝐻
1−𝜍 + 𝑛𝐹 𝜏𝑝𝐹 
1−𝜍
𝜇𝑤𝐿𝐻                                                                                 (17) 
𝐶𝐹𝐻 =
 𝜏𝑝𝐹 
−𝜍
𝑛𝐻𝑝𝐻
1−𝜍 + 𝑛𝐹 𝜏𝑝𝐹 
1−𝜍
𝜇𝑤𝐿𝐻                                                                             (18) 
Using the same method for the Foreign country, we get 
𝐶𝐹 =
𝑝𝐹
−𝜍
𝑛𝐻 𝜏𝑝𝐻 
1−𝜍 + 𝑛𝐹𝑝𝐹
1−𝜍
𝜇𝑤𝐿𝐹                                                                             (19) 
𝐶𝐻𝐹 =
 𝜏𝑝𝐻 
−𝜍
𝑛𝐻 𝜏𝑝𝐻 
1−𝜍 + 𝑛𝐹𝑝𝐹
1−𝜍
𝜇𝑤𝐿𝐹                                                                            (20) 
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The overall demand an H-good is 𝐷𝐻 = 𝐶𝐻 + 𝜏𝐶𝐻𝐹                                         (21) 
The overall demand an F-good is 𝐷𝐹 = 𝐶𝐹 + 𝜏𝐶𝐹𝐻                                          (22) 
If the number of firms is so large that the individual firm do not regard themselves as 
affecting the price indices, they will see themselves as facing a combined export and 
domestic demand curve with constant elasticity σ. 
𝑝 =
𝜍
𝜍 − 1
𝛽𝑤  
Furthermore, as prices, wages and all other parameters relevant for the entry decision 
of firms (zero profit condition) are equal, we have an equalisation of firm output. 
We turn to market clearing. We insert from (17) and (20) into (21) and from (18) and 
(19) into (22): 
𝑥
𝜇
=
𝑝−𝜍
𝑛𝐻𝑝
1−𝜍 + 𝑛𝐹 𝜏𝑝 
1−𝜍
𝑤𝐿𝐻 +
 𝜏𝑝 −𝜍
𝑛𝐹𝑝
1−𝜍 + 𝑛𝐻 𝜏𝑝 
1−𝜍
𝑤𝐿𝐹𝜏                                  (23) 
𝑥
𝜇
=
𝑝−𝜍
𝑛𝐹𝑝
1−𝜍 + 𝑛𝐻 𝜏𝑝 
1−𝜍
𝑤𝐿𝐹 +
 𝜏𝑝 −𝜍
𝑛𝐻𝑝
1−𝜍 + 𝑛𝐹 𝜏𝑝 
1−𝜍
𝑤𝐿𝐻𝜏                                  (24) 
We simplify by choosing units 𝑝 = 𝑤 = 1 and by defining 𝜌 = 𝜏1−𝜍 < 1 
𝑥
𝜇
=
1
𝑛𝐻 + 𝑛𝐹𝜌
𝐿𝐻 +
𝜌
𝑛𝐹 + 𝑛𝐻𝜌
𝐿𝐹                                                                                       (25) 
𝑥
𝜇
=
1
𝑛𝐹 + 𝑛𝐻𝜌
𝐿𝐹 +
𝜌
𝑛𝐻 + 𝑛𝐹𝜌
𝐿𝐻                                                                                       (26) 
We want to solve these two equations for 𝑛𝐻  and 𝑛𝐹 . 
We have three possible outcomes: 1) H produces all differentiated goods 2) F 
produces all differentiated goods 3) both countries produces some 
We know consumers spend a constant share of income on the differentiated good. We 
also know that the zero-profit condition ensures all income in the differentiated sector 
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goes to cover costs. With one factor of production these costs are all wage-costs. As 
wages are the same in the sectors, we conclude that a constant share of the total 
labour force 𝜇 𝐿𝐻 + 𝐿𝐹  will be employed in the differentiated sector. From this we 
can find the number of varieties. 
1)             𝑛𝐹 = 0 , 𝑛𝐻 =
𝜇 𝐿𝐻 + 𝐿𝐹 
𝑥
                                                               (27.1) 
2)             𝑛𝐻 = 0 , 𝑛𝐹 =
𝜇 𝐿𝐻 + 𝐿𝐹 
𝑥
                                                                (27.2) 
3)     If both 𝑛𝐻  and  𝑛𝐹  are positive, we can solve (25) and (26) to get
2
: 
sn =
1
 1 − ρ 
 sL − 𝜌 1 − sL  =
1
 1 − ρ 
  1 + ρ sL − 𝜌                                  (27.3) 
where sL =
𝐿𝐻
𝐿𝐻 +𝐿𝐹
. 
It makes sense to restrict sn  to be between zero and one. If the value of the expression 
above is outside of this, we will have full specialisation and be in either case 1) or 2). 
We can see that the limits for imperfect specialisation (case 3) are: 
ρ
1 − ρ
< sL <
1
1 − ρ
 
This means that if the countries are sufficiently different in size, the largest country 
will produce all the differentiated goods. This is a version of the home market effect, 
that the larger country will produce more than a proportional share of the increasing 
returns good. This is not the same as the alternative formulation that countries tend to 
export what they have a relatively large demand of. But they both spring out of a 
more fundamental idea that increasing-returns industries, other things equal, will tend 
to locate where their market is larger. 
                                              
2 This is shown in the appendix Solving for sn .  
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Note that the width of the band of non-specialisation depends on , which depends on 
𝜏. If transport costs are low, the band is narrow. As 𝜏 tends to one, we get full 
specialisation even if one country is only marginally larger. I consider it a problem 
with the fundamental framework that as transport costs move towards zero, the 
outcome has no similarity to the case with zero transport costs, which would imply no 
specialisation at all. This critique is similar to Thomas Holmes’ and John Stevens’ 
(2002) concern that as fixed costs move towards zero, the model bears no 
resemblance to the constant returns case. 
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4. Introducing heterogeneous productivity 
In this chapter I present the model of Chaney that I use a a basis of my analysis. I go 
through the setup and his results, and derive everything from beginning to the end. I 
do change some things in his model, and the effects of this change compared to 
Chaney’s will be noted. I will also draw comparisons to Krugman’s model several 
times. 
Utility of the consumer is given by: 
𝑈 = 𝑞0
1−𝜇
  𝑞(𝜔)(𝜍−1) 𝜍 𝑑𝜔
Ω
 
 𝜍 (𝜍−1)  𝜇
,𝜍 > 1     (28) 
As opposed to Chaney I have only one differentiated sector. Not sectors differentiated 
along substitutability. This does not affect results. We can still experiment with 
changing the value of sigma later on. 
The homogeneous good 0 is freely traded and is used as a numeraire. It is produced 
under CRS with one unit of labour in country n producing 𝑤𝑛  units of the good. I 
assume every country produces some of good 0, implying wages measured in the 
numeraire is proportional to 𝑤𝑛  in country n.  
Chaney uses variable and a fixed trade costs. Variable cost is of the iceberg type: If 
one unit of the differentiated good is shipped from country i to country j, only a 
fraction 1 𝜏𝑖𝑗  arrives. In addition, if a firm from from country i exports to country j, 
it must pay a fixed cost 𝑓𝑖𝑗 . As opposed to Chaney, I look at a two-country case. 
Some of the calculations will be a lot more tedious in this case, as you cannot, as 
Chaney, ignore the impact a single country has on the totality. 
Each firm draws a random productivity 𝜑. The cost of producing q units of a good 
and selling them in country j for a firm with productivity 𝜑 is: 
𝑐𝑖𝑗  𝑞 =
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜑
𝑞 + 𝑓𝑖𝑗            (29) 
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Firms are price setters. The optimal price charged in country j for a firm with 
productivity 𝜑 (after this called firm 𝜑) is: 𝑝𝑖𝑗  𝜑 = 𝜍/ 𝜍 − 1 𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗 /𝜑. The 
productivity shocks are drawn from a Pareto distribution with shape parameter 𝛾: 
productivity is distributed over [1,∞) according to 
P υ < 𝜑 = G υ = 1 − υ−γ,𝛾 > 𝜍 − 1     (30) 
𝛾 is an inverse measure of heterogeneity. (High 𝛾 - more homogeneous) Chaney 
assumes 𝛾 > 𝜍 − 1. The economic interpretation of this assumption is above my 
head. 
Mass of potential entrants is proportional to the quantity of effective labour: 𝑤𝑛𝐿𝑛 . 
This means that even in the absence of economies of scale, we have imperfect 
competition and positive profits. Chaney does not assume free entry. Treating number 
of firms as purely exogenous simplifies the analysis, but may be considered 
dissatisfactorily if this is to be thought of as a long run model. 
Each worker owns 𝑤𝑛  shares of a global fund which collects all profits in the world. 
 
4.1 Demand for the Differentiated goods 
Income in country n is 𝑌𝑗 = (1 + 𝜋) 𝑤𝑗 𝐿𝑗  
Given the optimal pricing of firms and the demand by consumers, exports from 
country i to country j, by firm 𝜑 are 
𝑥𝑖𝑗  𝜑 = 𝑝𝑖𝑗  𝜑 𝑞𝑖𝑗  𝜑 = 𝜇𝑌𝑗  
𝑝𝑖𝑗  𝜑 
𝑃𝑗
 
1−𝜍
                                                               (31) 
where 𝑃𝑗  is the price index for the differentiated good in country j. If only those firms 
above the productivity threshold 𝜑 𝑖𝑗  in country i export to country j, the ideal price 
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index for the differentiated good in country j, 𝑃𝑗 , and dividends per share , π, are 
defined as 
𝑃𝑗 =   𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖
2
𝑖=1
  
𝜍
𝜍 − 1
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜑
 
1−𝜍∞
𝜑 𝑖𝑗
𝑑𝐺(𝜑) 
1 (1−𝜍) 
                                          (32) 
𝜋 =
 𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖   𝜋𝑖𝑗  𝜑 𝑑
∞
𝜑 𝑖𝑗
𝐺(𝜑) 2𝑖,𝑙=1
 𝑤𝑛𝐿𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1
                                                                        (33) 
For the two country case, where 𝜋𝑖𝑗  𝜑 =  𝑝𝑖𝑗  𝜑 − 𝑐𝑖𝑗  𝜑  𝑞𝑖𝑗  𝜑 − 𝑓𝑖𝑗  are the net 
profits that a firm with productivity 𝜑 in country i earns from exporting to country j. 
4.2 Trade with Heterogenous Firms 
To compute global equilibrium of this world economy, I solve for the selection of 
firms into different export markets and generate predictions for aggregate bilateral 
trade flows. 
The derivations below can be found in Appendix: Chaney section II 
Productivity threshold: Exporters are only the most efficient of domestic firms. 
Profits for firm 𝜑 exporting from country i in country j: 
𝜋𝑖𝑗  𝜑 =
𝜇𝑌𝑗
𝜍
 𝜍/ 𝜍 − 1 𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗 /𝜑 
1−𝜍
𝑃𝑗
1−𝜍 − 𝑓𝑖𝑗  
We find the threshold 𝜑 𝑖𝑗  for exporting firms from 𝜋𝑖𝑗  𝜑 = 0: 
𝜑 𝑖𝑗  = 𝜆1  
𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑌𝑗
 
1  𝜍−1  
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝑃𝑗
                                                                         (34) 
where 
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𝜆1 =  
𝜍
𝜇
 
1  𝜍−1  𝜍
 𝜍 − 1 
 
Equilibrium Price Indices for differentiated good: We start with (32): 
𝑃𝑗 =   𝑤𝑘𝐿𝑘   
𝜍
𝜍 − 1
𝑤𝑘𝜏𝑘𝑗
𝜑
 
1−𝜍∞
𝜑 𝑘𝑗
2
𝑘=1
𝑑𝐺(𝜑) 
1 (1−𝜍) 
 
and derive 
𝑃𝑗 = 𝜆2 × 𝑌𝑗
1 𝛾 −1 (𝜍−1) 
× 𝜃𝑗                                                                                  (35) 
Where  𝜆2 =  
𝛾− 𝜍−1  
𝛾
 
1
𝛾
 
𝜍
𝜇
 
1  𝜍−1  −1 𝛾 
 
𝜍
𝜍−1
  
1+𝜋
𝑌
 
1
𝛾
 
and   𝜃𝑗 ≡   
𝑌𝑘
𝑌
 𝑤𝑘𝜏𝑘𝑗  
−𝛾
𝑓𝑘𝑗
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1
 2
𝑘=1  
−
1
𝛾
 
𝜋 is dividend per share and Y is world output. 𝜃𝑗  is a weighted average of bilateral 
trade barriers to j. 
Equilibrium Exports, Thresholds and Profits: To find exports I insert from (35) 
and for 𝑝𝑖𝑗  into (31): 
𝑥𝑖𝑗  𝜑 = 𝜆3 ×  
𝑌𝑗
𝑌
 
𝜍−1
𝛾
 
𝜃𝑗
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
 
𝜍−1
𝜑𝜍−1 , 𝑖𝑓 𝜑 > 𝜑 𝑖𝑗                                        (36) 
𝜆3 = 𝜍𝜆4
1−𝜍 , 𝜆4 =   
𝜍
𝜇
  
𝛾 
𝛾 −  𝜍 − 1 
  
1
 1 + 𝜋 
  
1
𝛾
 
To find productivity threshold I enter (35) into (34): 
𝜑 𝑖𝑗  = 𝜆4 ×  
𝑌
𝑌𝑗
 
1
𝛾
×  
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
 × 𝑓𝑖𝑗
1
𝜍−1                                                                (37) 
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𝜆4  =   
𝜍
𝜇
  
𝛾 
𝛾 −  𝜍 − 1 
  
1
1 + 𝜋
  
1
𝛾
 
Aggregate output in country i, is defined by: 
𝑌𝑖 =  1 + 𝜋 𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖 
Dividends per share can be found as 
𝜋 =
 
𝜍 − 1
𝛾  
𝜇
𝜍
1 −  
𝜍 − 1
𝛾  
𝜇
𝜍
 
In summary:         
𝑥𝑖𝑗  𝜑|𝜑 > 𝜑 𝑖𝑗  = 𝜆3 ×  
𝑌𝑗
𝑌
 
𝜍−1
𝛾
 
𝜃𝑗
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
 
𝜍−1
𝜑𝜍−1                                                     (36) 
𝜑 𝑖𝑗  = 𝜆4 ×  
𝑌
𝑌𝑗
 
1
𝛾
×  
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
 × 𝑓𝑖𝑗
1
𝜍−1                                                                          (37) 
𝑌𝑖 =  1 + 𝜋 𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖                                                                                                             38  
𝜋 =
 
𝜍 − 1
𝛾  
𝜇
𝜍
1 −  
𝜍 − 1
𝛾  
𝜇
𝜍
                                                                                                        (39) 
𝜆3 = 𝜍𝜆4
1−𝜍 , 𝜆4 =   
𝜍
𝜇
  
𝛾 
𝛾 −  𝜍 − 1 
  
1
 1 + 𝜋 
  
1
𝛾
 
𝜃𝑗 ≡  
𝑌𝑘
𝑌
 𝑤𝑘𝜏𝑘𝑗  
−𝛾
𝑓𝑘𝑗
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1 
2
𝑘=1
 
−
1
𝛾
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This system can be solved from the bottom and up. (39) is only a function of 
exogenous variables. (38) is only a function of exogenous variables and 𝜋. (36) and 
(37) are only functions of exogenous variables, 𝜋 and 𝑌𝑖 . 
Aggregate Trade: We can find (see appendix: Chanes section II) an expression for 
aggregate trade in differentiated goods from country i to country j given as: 
Proposition 1: Total exports (free on board) 𝑋𝑖𝑗 from country i to country j are given 
by: 
𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝜇 ×
𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗
𝑌
 
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
 
−𝛾
𝑓𝑖𝑗
− 
𝛾
𝜍−1
−1                                                                                (40) 
We call this the end of this chapter. We have derived the expressions we need. The 
utilisation of these expression will come in the next chapters. 
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5. Intensive versus Extensive Margins of trade 
Using the equation in (10), we cannot differentiate between intensive and extensive 
margin. We therefore use the expression  
𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖  𝑥𝑖𝑗  𝜑 𝑑𝐺(𝜑)
∞
𝜑 𝑖𝑗  
                                                               (41) 
Total differentiating this with respect to trade costs yields, using the Leibniz integral 
rule with infinity as the upper limit of integration gives 
𝑑𝑋𝑖𝑗 =  𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖  
𝜕𝑥 𝑖𝑗  𝜑 
𝜕𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝑑𝐺(𝜑)
∞
𝜑 𝑖𝑗  
 𝑑𝜏𝑖𝑗 −  𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖𝑥 𝜑 𝑖𝑗  𝐺′(𝜑 𝑖𝑗 ) ×
𝜕𝜑 𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝜏𝑖𝑗
 𝑑𝜏𝑖𝑗 +
 𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖  
𝜕𝑥 𝑖𝑗  𝜑 
𝜕𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑑𝐺(𝜑)
∞
𝜑 𝑖𝑗  
 𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑗 −  𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖𝑥 𝜑 𝑖𝑗  𝐺′(𝜑 𝑖𝑗 ) ×
𝜕𝜑 𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑓𝑖𝑗
 𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑗     (42) 
--------intensive margin--------     --------extensive margin---------- 
Following a reduction of trade barriers, each existing exporter  𝜑 > 𝜑 𝑖𝑗   exports 
more. This is the intensive margin. At the same time, higher potential profits attract 
new entrants (𝜑 𝑖𝑗  goes down). This is the extensive margin. 
5.1 Chaney’s n-country case 
We denote the elasticity of trade with respect to variable trade costs 𝜁. 
We denote the elasticity of trade with respect to fixed trade costs 𝜉. 
We find see the components of 𝜁 easiest from the expression: 
𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖𝜆3  
𝑌𝑗
𝑌
 
𝜍−1
𝛾
 
𝜃𝑗
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
 
𝜍−1
𝛾  −
1
(𝜍 − 1 − 𝛾)
  𝜆4 ×  
𝑌
𝑌𝑗
 
1
𝛾
×  
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
 × 𝑓𝑖𝑗
1
𝜍−1 
𝜍−1−𝛾
(43) 
(an intermediate step from the appendix) 
The first exponent of tau is the intensive margin, the last is the extensive margin. 
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𝜁 = −
𝑑𝑋𝑖𝑗 𝑋𝑖𝑗 
𝑑𝜏𝑖𝑗 𝜏𝑖𝑗 
= −
𝑑 ln 𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑑 ln 𝜏𝑖𝑗
=      𝜍 − 1       +        𝛾 −  𝜍 − 1     = 𝛾             (44) 
We can see that a large sigma leads to a large intensive margin-elasticity (which is 
what is anticipated by Krugman) while it dampens the extensive margin-elasticity 
with the same amount. Thus 
𝜕𝜁
𝜕𝜍
= 0                                              (45) 
 
To compare this to the Krugman case, we start with equation (20) and multiply with 
𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑖  to find the value of exports. Remember 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝𝑗 = 𝑝 
𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝜏𝑖𝑗 𝑝𝐶𝑖𝑗 =
 𝜏𝑖𝑗 𝑝 
1−𝜍
𝑛𝑖 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑝 
1−𝜍
+ 𝑛𝑗𝑝
1−𝜍
𝜇𝑤𝐿𝑗  
The elasticity in Krugmans two-country case, is complicated, and will be derived 
later. What Chaney does is that he compares with an n-country version of Krugman, 
which means that 𝜏𝑖𝑗  is considered not to have an impact on the price index in the 
denominator. If we for now think of the denominator as constant, we get: 
𝜁 = −
𝑑𝑋𝑖𝑗 𝑋𝑖𝑗 
𝑑𝜏 𝜏 
= 𝜍 − 1 
𝜕𝜁
𝜕𝜍
> 0                                                            (46) 
Elasticity of exports with respect to variable trade barriers in the Chaney model (𝛾) is 
larger than in the absence of heterogeneity, and larger than for each individual firm 
(both  𝜍 − 1). This is because a reduction in trade cost not only causes an increase in 
the exports of individual firms, but in addition allows new, less efficient firms to 
enter. 
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We use (43) to find 𝜉. As the fixed costs do not affect the intensive margin, the net 
effect equals the extensive effect. 
𝜉 = −
𝑑𝑋𝑖𝑗 𝑋𝑖𝑗 
𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑗 𝑓𝑖𝑗 
= −
𝑑 ln 𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑑 ln 𝑓𝑖𝑗
=       0        +       
𝛾
𝜍 − 1
− 1                                    (47) 
We can see that  
𝜕𝜉
𝜕𝜍
< 0                                                                      (48) 
The sum of the effects of the elasticity of substitution through fixed and variable trade 
costs is negative. Krugman gets the opposite effect because he has no fixed trade 
costs and no extensive margin (no heterogenous firms). As 𝜍 approaches 𝛾 + 1 from 
below, 𝜉 approaches zero. 
PROPOSITION 2 (Intensive and extensive margins): The elasticity of substitution (𝜍) 
has no effect on the elasticity of trade flows with respect to variable trade costs (𝜁), 
and a negative effect on the elasticity of trade flows with respect to fixed costs (𝜉). 
 
5.2 My Two-country case 
The above is true only if there are enough countries so that 𝜃𝑗  is not affected by a 
change in 𝜏𝑖𝑗 . This may hold in Chaney’s analysis, but not in the two country case. 
Chaney argues in a technical appendix on the internet that the two-country case only 
strengthens his findings, and I will show that this in a way is correct.  
In the following I will therefore also take account of a change in 𝜃𝑗 .  
𝜃𝑗 ≡  
𝑌𝑖
𝑌
 𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗  
−𝛾
𝑓𝑖𝑗
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1 +
𝑌𝑗
𝑌
𝑓𝑗𝑗
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1  
−
1
𝛾
                                 (49) 
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With this expression I do not know how to calculate the elasticities using logarithms. 
For simplicity, we use the expression for 𝑋𝑖𝑗  from (40): 
𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝜇 ×
𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗
𝑌
 
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
 
−𝛾
𝑓𝑖𝑗
− 
𝛾
𝜍−1
−1  
5.2.1 Elasticity of trade flows with respect to variable trade costs 
We start from (40): 
−𝜁 =
𝑑𝑋𝑖𝑗 𝑋𝑖𝑗 
𝑑𝜏𝑖𝑗 𝜏𝑖𝑗 
=
𝜇 ×
𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗
𝑌
𝑓𝑖𝑗
− 
𝛾
𝜍−1
−1  −𝛾  
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
 
−𝛾−1 𝑤𝑖𝜃𝑗 − 𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝜃𝑗
𝜕𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
2
𝜇 ×
𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗
𝑌  
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
 
−𝛾
𝑓𝑖𝑗
− 
𝛾
𝜍−1
−1 
× 𝜏𝑖𝑗  
Simplifying: 
𝜁 = −
𝑑𝑋𝑖𝑗 𝑋𝑖𝑗 
𝑑𝜏𝑖𝑗 𝜏𝑖𝑗 
= 𝛾  1 −
𝜕𝜃𝑗
𝜕𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
                                                     (50) 
Setting 𝑤𝑗 = 1, 𝜏𝑗𝑗 = 1,  we find from (49) 
𝜕𝜃𝑗
𝜕𝜏𝑖𝑗
= −
1
𝛾
 
𝑌𝑖
𝑌
 𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗  
−𝛾
𝑓𝑖𝑗
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1 +
𝑌𝑗
𝑌
𝑓𝑗𝑗
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1  
−
1
𝛾−1
×  −𝛾 
𝑌𝑖
𝑌
 𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗 
−𝛾−1
𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑗
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1  
and multiply by 
𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
 and simplifying: 
𝜕𝜃𝑗
𝜕𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
=
𝑌𝑖 𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗  
−𝛾
𝑓𝑖𝑗
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1 
𝑌𝑖 𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗  
−𝛾
𝑓𝑖𝑗
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1 + 𝑌𝑗 𝑓𝑗𝑗
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1 
 
We insert into (50) and simplify 
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𝜁 = −
𝑑𝑋𝑖𝑗 𝑋𝑖𝑗 
𝑑𝜏𝑖𝑗 𝜏𝑖𝑗 
=
 
 
 1
1 +
𝑌𝑖
𝑌𝑗
 𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗  
−𝛾
 
𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑓𝑗𝑗
 
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1 
 
 
 
 
From this we can find: 
𝜕𝜁
𝜕𝜍
< 0                                                 (51)  
To compare this to Krugman’s two-country case, we must derive the elasticity from 
(20) 
𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑝𝐶𝑖𝑗 =
 𝜏𝑖𝑗 𝑝 
1−𝜍
𝑛𝑖 𝜏𝑖𝑗 𝑝 
1−𝜍
+ 𝑛𝑗𝑝
1−𝜍
𝜇𝑤𝐿𝑗  
 
𝑑𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑑𝜏𝑖𝑗
=
 1 − 𝜍  𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑝 
−𝜍
𝜇𝑤𝐿𝑗  𝑝  𝑛𝑖 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑝 
1−𝜍
+ 𝑛𝑗𝑝
1−𝜍 −  𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑝 
1−𝜍
𝑛𝑖𝑝 
 𝑛𝑖 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑝 
1−𝜍
+ 𝑛𝑗𝑝
1−𝜍 
2  
𝜁 = −
𝑑𝑋𝑖𝑗 𝑋𝑖𝑗 
𝑑𝜏𝑖𝑗 𝜏𝑖𝑗 
= −
 1 − 𝜍  𝑛𝑖 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑝 
1−𝜍
+ 𝑛𝑗𝑝
1−𝜍 −  𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑝 
1−𝜍
𝑛𝑖 
𝑛𝑖 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑝 
1−𝜍
+ 𝑛𝑗𝑝
1−𝜍
 
𝜁 = −
𝑑𝑋𝑖𝑗 𝑋𝑖𝑗 
𝑑𝜏𝑖𝑗 𝜏𝑖𝑗 
=  𝜍 − 1 
𝑛𝑗𝑝
1−𝜍
𝑛𝑖 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑝 
1−𝜍
+ 𝑛𝑗𝑝
1−𝜍
 
𝜁 = −
𝑑𝑋𝑖𝑗 𝑋𝑖𝑗 
𝑑𝜏𝑖𝑗 𝜏𝑖𝑗 
=  𝜍 − 1 
1
𝑛𝑖
𝑛𝑗
𝜏𝑖𝑗 1−𝜍 + 1
 
𝜕𝜁
𝜕𝜍
> 0                                                                (52) 
So to sum up. In the n-country case, as can be seen from (45) and (46), Chaney gets 
no relation between 𝜍 and 𝜁, while Krugman anticipates a negative relation. As 
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Chaney states in his footnote, the result is in a way strengthened in the two-country 
case. The two-country Chaney model anticipates a positive relation while the two-
country Krugman model again predicts a negative relation. 
Even though Chaney is right that this is strictly stronger, it shows that 
𝜕𝜁
𝜕𝜍
= 0 only is 
true for the special case where one country is too small to affect the world/trade 
region. 
5.2.2 Elasticity of trade flows with respect to fixed trade costs 
The other elasticity to explore, is the elasticity of trade with respect to fixed trade 
costs. Again we start from (40) 
𝜉 = −
𝑑𝑋𝑖𝑗 𝑋𝑖𝑗 
𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑗 𝑓𝑖𝑗 
 
𝜉 =
−𝜇 ×
𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗
𝑌
 −𝛾 
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
 
−𝛾−1
 −
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
2
𝜕𝜃𝑗
𝜕𝑓𝑖𝑗
 𝑓𝑖𝑗
− 
𝛾
𝜍−1
−1 
+  
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
 
−𝛾
 1 −
𝛾
𝜍 − 1
 𝑓𝑖𝑗
− 
𝛾
𝜍−1
 
 𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝜇 ×
𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗
𝑌
 
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
 
−𝛾
𝑓𝑖𝑗
− 
𝛾
𝜍−1
−1 
 
𝜉 = −   1 −
𝛾
𝜍 − 1
 + 𝛾
𝜕𝜃𝑗
𝜕𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
                                                                             (53) 
We find from (17), after simplification 
𝜕𝜃𝑗
𝜕𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
= −
1
𝛾
𝑌𝑖 𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗  
−𝛾
 1 −
𝛾
𝜍 − 1 
𝑓𝑖𝑗
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1 
𝑌𝑖 𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗  
−𝛾
𝑓𝑖𝑗
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1 + 𝑌𝑗 𝑓𝑗𝑗
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1 
 
Inserting into (21) and rearranging : 
𝜉 = −  1 −
𝛾
𝜍 − 1
 −
𝑌𝑖 𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗  
−𝛾
 1 −
𝛾
𝜍 − 1 
𝑓𝑖𝑗
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1 
𝑌𝑖 𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗  
−𝛾
𝑓𝑖𝑗
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1 + 𝑌𝑗 𝑓𝑗𝑗
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1 
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𝜉 =  
𝛾
𝜍 − 1
− 1 
 
 
 
 
 
1
1 +
𝑌𝑖
𝑌𝑗
 𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗  
−𝛾
 
𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑓𝑗𝑗
 
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first factor is equal to Chaney’s elasticity. The second factor in the square 
brackets is positive, but less than one. So this elasticity is weakened in the two-
country case. The sigma present in these brackets draw in the same direction as the 
first, so sigma’s impact on the elasticity 𝜉 is strengthened in the two-country case. 
𝜕𝜉
𝜕𝜍
< 0 
Thus I have shown that Chaney’s results do not come into existence because he 
leaves the two-country case. On the countrary, both his findings are strengthened 
when we take the model back to two countries where comparison with the Krugman 
model is better. 
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6. The Hunt for the Home Market Effect 
Krugman, when writing about HME, writes that the large countries share of world 
production must be larger than the share of world income/size. So there is HME if the 
largest country has a larger than proportional share of the production. This implies 
that we have HME if  
𝑋𝑖
𝑋𝑖 + 𝑋𝑗
>
𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖
𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖 + 𝑤𝑗𝐿𝑗
 
for 𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖 > 𝑤𝑗 𝐿𝑗 , where total exports
3
 𝑋𝑖  are given by 
𝑋𝑖 =
𝑋𝑖𝑖
𝑋𝑗𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝑖
𝜇 1 + 𝜋 𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖 +
𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑋𝑗𝑗 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝜇 1 + 𝜋 𝑤𝑗𝐿𝑗  , 𝑖, 𝑗 = 𝐻, 𝐹 
In Helpman/Krugman (1985) this is analysed with the number of varieties directly 
instead of the value of exports to each market. We cannot use their framework here 
for two reasons: we have a continuum of varieties and thus not a well-defined number 
of firms. Secondly, output varies between firms because of heterogeneous 
productivity. Therefore the number of firms is of no interest anyway. 
Our first pursuit is to investigate how the shares of production 
𝑋𝑖
𝑋𝑖+𝑋𝑗
 depend on 
relative market size 
Yi
Y j
=
𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖
𝑤𝑗 𝐿𝑗
. 
We normalise 𝐿𝐹 = 1 and 𝑤𝐹 = 1.  
We derive total share of production:  
XH =
XHF
XHF + XFF
𝜇 1 + 𝜋 +
XHH
XHH + XFH
𝜇 1 + 𝜋 𝑤𝐻𝐿𝐻  
                                              
3 What I tend to term ”exports” are total ”exports both to the domestic market and the other market. It is really the value of 
total production of differentiated goods. 
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XF =
XFF
XFF + XHF
𝜇 1 + 𝜋 +
XFH
XFH + XHH
𝜇 1 + 𝜋 𝑤𝐻𝐿𝐻 
XH
XF
=
XHF
XHF + XFF
+
XHH
XHH + XFH
𝑤𝐻𝐿𝐻
XFF
XFF + XHF
+
XFH
XFH + XHH
𝑤𝐻𝐿𝐻
 
Defining country H’s market shares as U  and V 
𝑈 =
XHF
XHF + XFF
=
XHF
XFF
XHF
XFF
+ 1
= , V =
XHH
XHH + XFH
=
XHH
XFH
XHH
XFH
+ 1
 
XH
XF
=
U + V𝑤𝐻𝐿𝐻
 1 − U +  1 − V 𝑤𝐻𝐿𝐻
 
XF
XH
=
1 − U + 𝑤𝐻𝐿𝐻 − V𝑤𝐻𝐿𝐻
U + V𝑤𝐻𝐿𝐻
=
1 + 𝑤𝐻𝐿𝐻
U + V𝑤𝐻𝐿𝐻
− 1 
XF + XH
XH
=
1 + 𝑤𝐻𝐿𝐻
U + V𝑤𝐻𝐿𝐻
 
XH
XH + XF
=
U + V𝑤𝐻𝐿𝐻
1 + 𝑤𝐻𝐿𝐻
= U
1
1 + 𝑤𝐻𝐿𝐻
+ V
𝑤𝐻𝐿𝐻
1 + 𝑤𝐻𝐿𝐻
 
Defining SX =
XH
XH +XF
 , SL =
𝑤𝐻𝐿𝐻
𝑤𝐻𝐿𝐻 +1
 gives us 
SX =
XH
XH + XF
= U 1 − SL + VSL 
SX =
XH
XH + XF
= U +  V − U SL                                                                          (54) 
which is a close parallel to Helpman/Krugman’s  (27 ). There are however vital 
differences. In the H/K’s equation, SX  will equal zero for a strictly positive SL. We 
can rule that out in our equation. To get that, we would have to have 𝑈 > 𝑉 which 
would imply that each country would have a larger market share abroad than at home. 
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That is clearly not likely. On the contrary, SX  tends to U as SL tends to zero. The next 
thing we observe is that as SL tends to one, SX  tends to 𝑉.  
The next important difference is that U and V are not constants! They are themselves 
functions of relative size. We are therefore nowhere near disclosing the HME 
properties of this model. We can see that as long as both countries have a positive 
market share in both markets, 𝑈 > 0 , 𝑉 < 1. We can see that complete 
specialisation can only take place if market shares can  reach zero for 0 < SL < 1. 
This will be investigated next. 
To sum up this first part: An increase in relative size will shift the importance of the 
markets. As the proportionality factor is higher in the domestic market than in the 
foreign market, each country will gain ground relatively if their own country grows. 
 
6.1 The Total effect on National market shares 
There may be four channels for the increase in production that comes from an 
increase in country size. We have so far studied the first. The last three comes from 
the determination of aggregate exports to each country 𝑋𝑖𝑗 . It is these aggregate 
exports to each market that must be analysed to be inserted into U and V above. Only 
when we know the behaviour of  the market shares as relative size changes, we can 
say anything about the home market effect in Chaney’s model. 
Before we decompose exports into its constituent parts, let us first study the aggregate 
effect on market shares of a rise in relative size. From Chaney’s proposition 1 we 
have that total exports 𝑋𝑖𝑗 from country i to country j are given by: 
𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝜇 ×
𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗
𝑌
 
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
 
−𝛾
𝑓𝑖𝑗
− 
𝛾
𝜍−1
−1   
we normalise 𝐿𝑗 = 1. For simplicity we also normalise 𝑤𝑗 = 1 while 𝜏𝑗𝑗  is already 
assumed equal to one. 
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𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝜇 ×
 1 + 𝜋 𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖
 𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖 + 1 
 
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
 
−𝛾
𝑓𝑖𝑗
− 
𝛾
𝜍−1
−1  
Relative production for market j. 
𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑋𝑗𝑗
=
𝜇 ×
 1 + 𝜋 𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖
 𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖 + 1 
 
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
 
−𝛾
𝑓𝑖𝑗
− 
𝛾
𝜍−1−1 
𝜇 ×
 1 + 𝜋 
 𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖 + 1 
 
1
𝜃𝑗
 
−𝛾
𝑓𝑗𝑗
− 
𝛾
𝜍−1
−1 
 
𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑋𝑗𝑗
= 𝑤𝑖
1−𝛾𝜏𝑖𝑗
−𝛾𝐿𝑖  
𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑓𝑗𝑗
 
− 
𝛾
𝜍−1
−1 
                                                                      (55) 
which is linearly increasing in 𝐿𝑖 . If we consider market i. 
𝑋𝑖𝑖
𝑋𝑗𝑖
=
𝜇 ×
 1 + 𝜋 𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖
 𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖 + 1 
 
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑖
𝜃𝑖
 
−𝛾
𝑓𝑖𝑖
− 
𝛾
𝜍−1
−1 
𝜇 ×
 1 + 𝜋 𝑤𝑗 𝐿𝑗
 𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖 + 1 
 
𝑤𝑗 𝜏𝑗𝑖
𝜃𝑖
 
−𝛾
𝑓𝑗𝑖
− 
𝛾
𝜍−1−1 
 
𝑋𝑖𝑖
𝑋𝑗𝑖
= 𝑤𝑖
1−𝛾𝜏𝑗𝑖
𝛾𝐿𝑖  
𝑓𝑖𝑖
𝑓𝑗𝑖
 
− 
𝛾
𝜍−1
−1 
                                                                      (56) 
which is also increasing in 𝐿𝑖 . The sum of this is that as the relative size of country i 
increases, its market share increases as well. Note that as relative size tends to zero, 
relative supply tends to zero. As relative size tends to infinity, relative production 
tends to infinity. We can see from (55) and (56) that relative sales are proportional to 
relative size. The factors of proportionality are here  
𝑤𝑖
1−𝛾𝜏𝑖𝑗
−𝛾  
𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑓𝑗𝑗
 
− 
𝛾
𝜍−1
−1 
 
𝑤𝑖
1−𝛾 𝜏𝑗𝑖
𝛾  
𝑓𝑖𝑖
𝑓𝑗𝑖
 
− 
𝛾
𝜍−1
−1 
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The factor of proportionality can be larger than, equal to or smaller than one. Only if 
it is equal to one, the share of production will also be proportional to the share of 
world size. In this case it cannot be equal to one in both markets. Therefore the share 
of production will generally be different from share of size. It is not given, however, 
that the largest country will have a larger than proportional share in each market. On 
the contrary, the country with the most fortunate parameter values will supply a larger 
than proportional share independent of size. Note that the transformation from 
relative value to shares is not difficult. Market share is a function of relative size: 
XHF
XHF + XFF
=
XHF
XFF
XHF
XFF
+ 1
 
U and V can therefore be considered either as the share or as a function of relative 
values.  
  
6.2 Decomposing national market shares 
We have studied the first component of the share of total world production, namely 
the relative size of the national markets. The last three all add up to national market 
shares 
Xij
Xij +X jj
. We now decompose into the determinants of national market shares. 
We will study this in terms of relative sizes, and translate this into shares later.  
Inspecting this expression for aggregate exports from country i to country j 
𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖  𝑥𝑖𝑗  𝜑 𝑑𝐺(𝜑)
∞
𝜑 𝑖𝑗  
                                                                                      (41) 
we can see that if 𝐿𝑖  increases, we will have a proportional increase in the density of 
firms (𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖). Dividing sales from i to j with j’s domestic sales: 
42 
 
𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑋𝑗𝑗
= 𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖
 𝑥𝑖𝑗  𝜑 𝑑𝐺(𝜑)
∞
𝜑 𝑖𝑗  
 𝑥𝑗𝑗  𝜑 𝑑𝐺(𝜑)
∞
𝜑 𝑗𝑗  
 
we see that the direct effect of firm density on relative sales are linear in relative size 
𝐿𝑖 . This factor may therefore explain all variation in relative production, as we have 
seen above from (55) and (56) that relative sales will indeed be linear in relative size. 
This means that we anticipate the integral to be constant as size changes. We will 
investigate this.  
The two other possible channels of change are a change in the productivity cut-offs 
(limits of integration) and the value of output per firm 𝑥𝑖𝑗  𝜑 . We will try to 
decompose exports’ dependence on size in the three components. As the first (firm 
density)  is trivial, we go to the cut-offs. 
6.3 How the limit of entry varies with country size 
We start from the expression for 𝜃𝑗  from (35) and equation (37). As I am not really 
that interested in the exogenous wage differences, I put 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤𝑗 = 1. 𝜏𝑖𝑖 = 𝜏𝑗𝑗  is 
already assumed equal to one. 𝐿𝑖  is as above relative size. 
𝜃𝑗 ≡  
𝑌𝑖
𝑌
𝜏𝑖𝑗
−𝛾𝑓𝑖𝑗
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1 +
𝑌𝑗
𝑌
𝜏𝑗𝑗
−𝛾𝑓𝑗𝑗
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1  
−
1
𝛾
                                             (35) 
𝜑 𝑖𝑗  = 𝜆4 ×  
𝑌
𝑌𝑗
 
1
𝛾
×  
𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
 × 𝑓𝑖𝑗
1
𝜍−1                                                              (37) 
We start by inserting for the Ys and work with 𝜃𝑗  first.  
For convenience, we use 𝜏𝑖𝑗
−𝛾𝑓𝑖𝑗
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1
 = 𝐴 and 𝑓𝑗𝑗
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1
 = 𝐵 
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We also assume that it is more costly to get access to the foreign market than the 
home market, and that each market is most easily accessed from itself. This is a weak 
assumption: 𝑓𝑖𝑗 , 𝑓𝑗𝑖 > 𝑓𝑖𝑖 , 𝑓𝑗𝑗  
National income is found from (38) 
𝑌𝑖 = (1 + 𝜋) 𝐿𝑖  
𝜃𝑗 ≡  
 1 + 𝜋 𝐿𝑖
 1 + 𝜋  𝐿𝑖 + 1 
𝐴 +
 1 + 𝜋 
 1 + 𝜋  𝐿𝑖 + 1 
𝐵 
−
1
𝛾
 
𝜃𝑗 ≡  
𝐿𝑖
 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
𝐴 +
1
 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
𝐵 
−
1
𝛾
                                                                                 (57) 
∂𝜃𝑗
∂𝐿𝑖
= −
1
𝛾
 
𝐿𝑖
 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
𝐴 +
1
 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
𝐵 
−
1
𝛾
−1
 
1
 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
2
𝐴 −
1
 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
2
𝐵  
∂𝜃𝑗
∂𝐿𝑖
= −
1
𝛾
𝜃𝑗
1
 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
2 𝐴 −
1
 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
2 𝐵
𝐿𝑖
 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
𝐴 +
1
 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
𝐵
 
∂𝜃𝑗
∂𝐿𝑖
= −
1
𝛾
𝜃𝑗
1
 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
 𝐴 − 𝐵 
 𝐿𝑖𝐴 + 𝐵 
                                                                              (58)         
We go back to the limit of integration 𝜑 𝑖𝑗  inserted for 𝑌 and 𝑌𝑗 : 
𝜑 𝑖𝑗  = 𝜆4 ×  
 1 + 𝜋  𝐿𝑖 + 1 
 1 + 𝜋 
 
1
𝛾
×  
𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
 × 𝑓𝑖𝑗
1
𝜍−1 
 𝜑 𝑖𝑗 = 𝜆4 ×  𝐿𝑖 + 1 
1
𝛾 ×  
𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
 × 𝑓𝑖𝑗
1
𝜍−1 
∂𝜑 𝑖𝑗
∂𝐿𝑖
= 𝜆4 × 𝑓𝑖𝑗
1
𝜍−1  
1
𝛾
 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
1
𝛾
−1
×  
𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
 +  𝐿𝑖 + 1 
1
𝛾 ×  −
𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
2 
∂𝜃𝑗
∂𝐿𝑖
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= 𝜆4 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
1
𝛾  
𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
 𝑓𝑖𝑗
1
𝜍−1  
1
𝛾
 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
−1 −
1
𝜃𝑗
∂𝜃𝑗
∂𝐿𝑖
  
= 𝜑 𝑖𝑗  
1
𝛾
 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
−1 −
1
𝜃𝑗
∂𝜃𝑗
∂𝐿𝑖
  
∂𝜑 𝑖𝑗
∂𝐿𝑖
= 𝜑 𝑖𝑗   
1
𝛾 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
 −
1
𝜃𝑗
∂𝜃𝑗
∂𝐿𝑖
  
Inserting for 
∂𝜃𝑗
∂𝐿𝑖
 from (58) gives 
= 𝜑 𝑖𝑗   
1
𝛾 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
 −
1
𝜃𝑗
 −𝜃𝑗
1
𝛾 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
 𝐴 − 𝐵 
 𝐿𝑖𝐴 + 𝐵 
   
∂𝜑 𝑖𝑗
∂𝐿𝑖
= 𝜑 𝑖𝑗
1
𝛾 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
 1 +
𝐴 − 𝐵
𝐿𝑖𝐴 + 𝐵
                                        (59) 
We can see that this is positive for all values of the parameters. The change is also 
proportional to the limit itself. 
 The conclusion is 
∂𝜑 𝑖𝑗
∂𝐿𝑖
> 0 
This was the first step in studying the limits of entry. We have three more limits of 
integration to consider: 𝜑 𝑗𝑗 , 𝜑 𝑗𝑖  and 𝜑 𝑖𝑖 . 
The next limit I consider is the cut-off for firms in j to access its domestic market. 
The limit, inserted for 𝑌 and 𝑌𝑗  is given by 
𝜑 𝑗𝑗  = 𝜆4 ×  𝐿𝑖 + 1 
1
𝛾 ×
1
𝜃𝑗
𝑓𝑗𝑗
1
𝜍−1 
𝜃𝑗  is same as before, and calculation the same as above. We get 
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∂𝜑 𝑗𝑗
∂𝐿𝑖
= 𝜑 𝑗𝑗
1
𝛾 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
 1 +
𝐴 − 𝐵
𝐿𝑖𝐴 + 𝐵
                                                         (60) 
which is positive for all positive values of the parameters. As above, the change is 
proportional to the limit itself, and interestingly, the proportionality factor is the 
same. 
 Therefore: 
∂𝜑 𝑗𝑗
∂𝐿𝑖
> 0 
For the last two limits we need 
∂𝜃𝑖
∂𝐿𝑖
. 
𝜃𝑖 ≡  
𝐿𝑖
 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
𝐶 +
1
 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
𝐷 
−
1
𝛾
                                                                  (61) 
∂𝜃𝑖
∂𝐿𝑖
= −𝜃𝑖
1
𝛾 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
𝐶 − 𝐷
 𝐿𝑖𝐶 + 𝐷 
                                                                       (62) 
where 𝐶 = 𝑓𝑖𝑖
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1
 and 𝐷 = 𝜏𝑗𝑖
−𝛾𝑓𝑗𝑖
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1
  
We then calculate the cut-off for entry from i to its domestic market 
𝜑 𝑖𝑖  = 𝜆4 ×  1 +
1
𝐿𝑖
 
1
𝛾
×  
1
𝜃𝑖
 × 𝑓𝑖𝑖
1
𝜍−1 
∂𝜑 𝑖𝑖
∂𝐿𝑖
= 𝜆4 × 𝑓𝑖𝑖
1
𝜍−1  
1
𝛾
 1 +
1
𝐿𝑖
 
1
𝛾
−1
 −
1
 𝐿𝑖 
2
 ×  
1
𝜃𝑖
 +  1 +
1
𝐿𝑖
 
1
𝛾
 −
1
𝜃𝑖
2
∂𝜃𝑖
∂𝐿𝑖
   
∂𝜑 𝑖𝑖
∂𝐿𝑖
= −𝜑 𝑖𝑖  
1
𝛾 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
 
1
𝐿𝑖
 +
1
𝜃𝑖
∂𝜃𝑖
∂𝐿𝑖
  
Inserting: 
∂𝜑 𝑖𝑖
∂𝐿𝑖
= −𝜑 𝑖𝑖
1
𝛾 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
 
1
𝐿𝑖
−
𝐶 − 𝐷
𝐿𝑖𝐶 + 𝐷
                                                            (63) 
46 
 
We can see that 
1
𝐿𝑖
≥
𝐶−𝐷
𝐿𝑖𝐶+𝐷
 for all parameter values, so the expression is negative. 
The last limit: 
𝜑 𝑗𝑖  = 𝜆4 ×  1 +
1
𝐿𝑖
 
1
𝛾
×  
𝜏𝑗𝑖
𝜃𝑖
 × 𝑓𝑗𝑖
1
𝜍−1                                               
∂𝜑 𝑗𝑖
∂𝐿𝑖
= −𝜑 𝑗𝑖  
1
𝛾 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
 
1
𝐿𝑖
−
𝐶 − 𝐷
𝐿𝑖𝐶 + 𝐷
                                                                   (64) 
As above, we can see that this is necessarily negative.  We have that the changes in 
the limits are proportional to the limits themselves, and with the same factor of 
proportionality between them, but different from those for access to country j.  
We collect the four derivatives from above: 
∂𝜑 𝑖𝑗
∂𝐿𝑖
= 𝜑 𝑖𝑗
1
𝛾 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
 1 +
𝐴 − 𝐵
𝐿𝑖𝐴 + 𝐵
 > 0                                                               (59) 
∂𝜑 𝑗𝑗
∂𝐿𝑖
= 𝜑 𝑗𝑗
1
𝛾 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
 1 +
𝐴 − 𝐵
𝐿𝑖𝐴 + 𝐵
 > 0                                                                 (60) 
∂𝜑 𝑖𝑖
∂𝐿𝑖
= −𝜑 𝑖𝑖
1
𝛾 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
 
1
𝐿𝑖
−
𝐶 − 𝐷
𝐿𝑖𝐶 + 𝐷
  < 0                                                           (63) 
∂𝜑 𝑗𝑖
∂𝐿𝑖
= −𝜑 𝑗𝑖  
1
𝛾 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
 
1
𝐿𝑖
−
𝐶 − 𝐷
𝐿𝑖𝐶 + 𝐷
 < 0                                                           (64) 
𝐴 = 𝜏𝑖𝑗
−𝛾𝑓𝑖𝑗
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1
  ,  𝐵 = 𝑓𝑗𝑗
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1
  ,  𝐶 = 𝑓𝑖𝑖
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1
  ,  𝐷 = 𝜏𝑗𝑖
−𝛾𝑓𝑗𝑖
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1
  
Thus both countries will sell a broader band of varieties in country i if this country 
grows relative to j. So the growing market will receive goods from increasingly 
ineffective firms in both countries while the cut-offs into the relatively diminishing 
country will rise.  
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6.4 Relative Output per Variety 
At last, we investigate if a change in relative size has an effect on relative sales per 
variety. This is the third determinant of relative national market shares. We know that 
𝑥𝑖𝑗  𝜑 = 𝑝𝑖𝑗  𝜑 𝑞𝑖𝑗  𝜑 = 𝜇𝑌𝑗  
𝑝𝑖𝑗  𝜑 
𝑃𝑗
 
1−𝜍
= 𝜇𝑌𝑗  
𝜍
𝜍 − 1
1
𝜑
𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝑃𝑗
 
1−𝜍
 
and from this we find 
𝑥𝑖𝑗  𝜑 
𝑥𝑗𝑗  𝜑 
= 𝜏𝑖𝑗
1−𝜍  ,               
𝑥𝑖𝑖 𝜑 
𝑥𝑗𝑖  𝜑 
=  
1
𝜏𝑗𝑖
 
1−𝜍
 
As we can see, the relative sales (into each market) of varieties produced with the 
same productivity level are not dependent on size. Relative sales of each variety 
therefore add nothing to the aggregate effect of size. 
6.5 Total Effect on Share of production 
To sum up this section, we bring back (54), (55), (56) and the expressions for U and 
V.  
𝑆𝑋 =
𝑋𝑖
𝑋𝑖 + 𝑋𝑗
= 𝑈 +  𝑉 − 𝑈 𝑆𝐿                                                                          (54) 
𝑈 =
𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑋𝑗𝑗
𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑋𝑗𝑗
+ 1
 , 𝑉 =
𝑋𝑖𝑖
𝑋𝑗𝑖
𝑋𝑖𝑖
𝑋𝑗𝑖
+ 1
 
𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑋𝑗𝑗
= 𝜏𝑖𝑗
−𝛾𝐿𝑖  
𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑓𝑗𝑗
 
− 
𝛾
𝜍−1
−1 
                                                                                 (55) 
𝑋𝑖𝑖
𝑋𝑗𝑖
= 𝜏𝑗𝑖
𝛾𝐿𝑖  
𝑓𝑖𝑖
𝑓𝑗𝑖
 
− 
𝛾
𝜍−1
−1 
                                                                                    (56) 
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We can see from these expressions that as 𝑆𝐿  tends to zero, 𝑆𝑋  tends to U. But when 
𝑆𝐿 tends to zero 𝐿𝑖  also tends to zero. That implies that U tends to zero as well. So the 
total effect is, unsurprisingly, that country i will not have positive output when empty 
of workers. 
As 𝑆𝐿  tends to one 𝐿𝑖  tends to infinity and 𝑆𝑋  tends to V. But again; V is not constant 
but tends to one. So we know now that 𝑆𝑋  as a function of 𝑆𝐿  crosses through the 
origin and the point (1,1). We turn to a figure to get an idea of the shape. 
 
We can see that contrary to the Helpman/Krugman model, this model have no 
intercepts with 𝑆𝑋 = 0, 𝑆𝑋 = 1. We also see that it has a nonlinear shape. That means 
that for some intervals, a rise in 𝑆𝐿 leads to a less than proportional rise in 𝑆𝑋 , while 
on the middle interval the rise in 𝑆𝑋  is larger than proportional. If we study the best 
fitted linear approximation, we can see that this resembles the Helpman/Krugman-
-0,2
0,0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1,0
1,2
0,0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1,0 1,2
SX
SL
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figure. This is indeed evidence of a HME! If a 45º line from the origin is imagined 
above, it would reveal that for 𝑆𝐿 > 1/2 → 𝑆𝑋 > 𝑆𝐿 . 
Manipulating the parameters does not give me a stronger non-linear shape than the 
above. The curve tends to lie very close to the 45º line, so the home market effect is 
not strong. 
Finally, I will add some intuition to the technicalities. The most important question is 
why this figure gets a different shape from the Helpman/Krugman-figure. I believe 
the chief reason for never having complete specialisation is that no matter how small 
a country grows, there will always be a few extremely productive firms able to 
overcome any trade obstacles and size disadvantages. This model (like H/K) does not 
allow firms to move to the largest country. They are stuck where they are, and can 
only choose production or non-production. 
But as far as I can understand, there is also another reason that adds to this. The 
system of fixed costs makes it viable to produce for the home market even if a firm is 
too inefficient to enter the foreign market. This effect will not work when 𝑆𝐿  is very 
large or very small however, as the limit of entry will actually be lower into the large 
foreign country than into the small domestic country for great size differences. 
Thus I have shown that Chaney’s model preserve the HME, if only weakly. The 
model does not predict full specialisation, which is contrary to Helpman/Krugman. 
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7. Impact of a Change in Size on the Price Indices 
The ideal price index is a measure of the minimum cost of obtaining one unit of 
utility. Given that the models we are looking at have exogenous wage formation 
income is not affected by trade. Therefore the ideal price index is an inverse measure 
of utility. A lower price index leads to a higher utility level.  
I would like to see how the price indices is affected by a change in country size. For 
comparison, I will first go through how price indices are effected by a change in 
country size in the standard Krugman framework, with and without a homogeneous 
good. Then I go to the Chaney model. 
One note. As I normalise 𝐿𝐹 = 1 this will of course affect the level of the price index. 
That might be considered unfortunate, but is not a large problem. Although I tend to 
write about relative size, I believe that might be inaccurate. It is not the same to study 
a rise in 𝐿𝐹  and a fall in 𝐿𝐻  unless we only study the price indices relative to each 
other. A rise in 𝐿𝐻  can in the below therefore not be understood as a fall in 𝐿𝐹 . 
 
7.1 The impact of a change in size on price indices – 
Krugman case 
7.1.1 Without a Homogeneous good 
Two country case with symmetric trade costs and no homogeneous good we get: 
𝑃𝑖 =  
𝐿𝑖
𝜍𝛼
𝑝1−𝜍 +
𝐿𝑗
𝜍𝛼
 𝜏𝑝 1−𝜍  
1
1−𝜍
 , 𝑖, 𝑗 = 𝐻, 𝐹 
∂𝑃𝑖
∂𝐿𝑖
=
1
1 − 𝜍
 
𝐿𝑖
𝜍𝛼
𝑝1−𝜍 +
𝐿𝑗
𝜍𝛼
 𝜏𝑝 1−𝜍  
𝜍
1−𝜍 1
𝜍𝛼
𝑝1−𝜍  
∂𝑃𝑖
∂𝐿𝑗
=
1
1 − 𝜍
 
𝐿𝑖
𝜍𝛼
𝑝1−𝜍 +
𝐿𝑗
𝜍𝛼
 𝜏𝑝 1−𝜍  
𝜍
1−𝜍 1
𝜍𝛼
 𝜏𝑝 1−𝜍  
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These are both negative (as σ > 1). We can also see that 
∂𝑃𝑖
∂𝐿𝑖
∂𝑃𝑖
∂𝐿𝑗
=
1
τ1−σ
 = τσ−1 > 1, so the 
price index of the growing country will have its price index most affected.  
7.1.2 Introducing a Homogeneous good 
Note that in the coming, this price index is an index of differentiated goods only. I am 
uncertain as to whether including the homogeneous good will change the qualitative 
results. The expression for the price index is taken from the denominator in (18).  
𝑃𝑖 =  𝑛𝑖𝑝
1−𝜍 + 𝑛𝑗  𝜏𝑝 
1−𝜍  
1
1−𝜍 , 𝑖, 𝑗 = 𝐻,𝐹                                                             (65)  
∂𝑃𝑖
∂𝐿𝐻
=
1
1 − 𝜍
 𝑛𝑖𝑝
1−𝜍 + 𝑛𝑗  𝜏𝑝 
1−𝜍  
𝜍
1−𝜍 × 𝑝1−𝜍  
∂𝑛𝑖
∂𝐿𝐻
+
∂𝑛𝑗
∂𝐿𝐻
𝜏1−𝜍 , 𝑖, 𝑗 = 𝐻, 𝐹       (66) 
We find values for 𝑛𝑖  and 𝑛𝑗  from (27) and translate it into H,F notation with 𝐿𝐹 = 1. 
We also insert for sL =
𝐿𝐻
𝐿𝐻 +𝐿𝐹
=
1
1+
1
𝐿𝐻
 
𝑛𝐻 = sn
𝜇 𝐿𝐻 + 1 
𝑥
=
1
 1 − ρ 
  1 + ρ sL − 𝜌 
𝜇 𝐿𝐻 + 1 
𝑥
=  
1 + ρ
1 +
1
𝐿𝐻
− 𝜌 
𝜇 𝐿𝐻 + 1 
𝑥 1 − ρ 
 
𝑛𝐹 =  1 − sn 
𝜇 𝐿𝐻 + 1 
𝑥
=  
1 −  1 + ρ sL
 1 − ρ 
 
𝜇 𝐿𝐻 + 1 
𝑥
=  1 −
1 + ρ
1 +
1
𝐿𝐻
 
𝜇 𝐿𝐻 + 1 
𝑥 1 − ρ 
 
∂𝑛𝐻
∂𝐿𝐻
=
𝜇
𝑥 1 − ρ 
> 0                           (67.1) 
∂𝑛𝐹
∂𝐿𝐻
= −
𝜇ρ
𝑥 1 − ρ 
< 0                           (67.2) 
Inserting into  66 we get 
∂𝑃𝐻
∂𝐿𝐻
=
1
1 − 𝜍
 𝑛𝐻𝑝
1−𝜍 + 𝑛𝐹 𝜏𝑝 
1−𝜍  
𝜍
1−𝜍 × 𝑝1−𝜍
𝜇
𝑥 1 − ρ 
 1 − ρ𝜏1−𝜍  
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∂𝑃𝐹
∂𝐿𝐻
=
1
1 − 𝜍
 𝑛𝐹𝑝
1−𝜍 + 𝑛𝐻 𝜏𝑝 
1−𝜍  
𝜍
1−𝜍 × 𝑝1−𝜍
𝜇
𝑥 1 − ρ 
 𝜏1−𝜍 − ρ  
It is the last term that will govern the signs here. We can see that 
 1 − ρ𝜏1−𝜍 > 0,  thus 
∂𝑃𝐻
∂𝐿𝐻
< 0 
 𝜏1−𝜍 − ρ = 0,  thus 
∂𝑃𝐹
∂𝐿𝐻
= 0 
So from the Krugman case we can derive the following results: 
- A country will be better off if it is large. 
- A country is indifferent between whether the trading partner is small or large. 
I think this last result is strange, as it seems to rule out gains from trade. My math 
seems to be correct, so my guess is that this is only true as long as the countries are 
not too dissimilar in size, so that the homogeneous sector can absorb spare capacity 
and ensure wage equalisation. We now turn to the Chaney model. 
 
7.2 The impact of a change in size on price indices – 
Chaney case 
My question now is what sort of results Chaney’s model will yield. From an 
expression for the price index (intermediate step in appendix: Chaney section II) we 
have by setting 𝐿𝐹 = 𝑤𝐹 = 1 
𝑃𝑗 =
𝜍
𝜍 − 1
 𝛾 𝑤𝑘𝐿𝑘 𝑤𝑘𝜏𝑘𝑗  
1−𝜍
 𝜑𝜍−2−𝛾𝑑𝜑
∞
𝜑 𝑘𝑗
𝑗
𝑘=𝑖
 
1  1−𝜍  
                           (68) 
𝑃𝐻 =
𝜍
𝜍 − 1
 𝛾𝐿𝐻𝑤𝐻
2−𝜍  𝜑𝜍−2−𝛾𝑑𝜑
∞
𝜑 𝐻𝐻
+ 𝛾 𝜏𝐹𝐻 
1−𝜍  𝜑𝜍−2−𝛾𝑑𝜑
∞
𝜑 𝐹𝐻
 
1  1−𝜍  
  (69.1) 
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𝑃𝐹 =
𝜍
𝜍 − 1
 𝛾𝐿𝐻𝑤𝐻
2−𝜍𝜏𝐻𝐹
1−𝜍  𝜑𝜍−2−𝛾𝑑𝜑
∞
𝜑 𝐻𝐹
+ 𝛾 𝜑𝜍−2−𝛾𝑑𝜑
∞
𝜑 𝐹𝐹
 
1  1−𝜍  
      (69.2) 
We differentiate these with respect to 𝐿𝐻 , using the Leibniz integral rule with infinity 
as the upper limit of integration. 
∂𝑃𝐻
∂𝐿𝐻
=  
𝜍
𝜍 − 1
  
1
1 − 𝜍
  …  𝐻
𝜍
1−𝜍 ×
∂ …  𝐻
∂𝐿𝐻
                                                              (70.1) 
∂ …  𝐻
∂𝐿𝐻
= 𝛾𝑤𝐻
2−𝜍  𝜑𝜍−2−𝛾𝑑𝜑
∞
𝜑 𝐻𝐻
− 𝛾𝐿𝐻𝑤𝐻
2−𝜍  𝜑 𝐻𝐻
𝜍−2−𝛾
𝜕𝜑 𝐻𝐻
𝜕𝐿𝐻
 
− 𝛾 𝜏𝐹𝐻 
1−𝜍  𝜑 𝐹𝐻
𝜍−2−𝛾
𝜕𝜑 𝐹𝐻
𝜕𝐿𝐻
                                                        (71.1) 
The effect of a change in 𝐿𝐻  on the index for country F can be found as 
∂𝑃𝐹
∂𝐿𝐻
=  
𝜍
𝜍 − 1
  
1
1 − 𝜍
  …  𝐹
𝜍
1−𝜍 ×
∂ …  𝐹
∂𝐿𝐻
                                                             (70.2) 
∂ …  𝐹
∂𝐿𝐻
= 𝛾𝑤𝐻
2−𝜍𝜏𝐻𝐹
1−𝜍  𝜑𝜍−2−𝛾𝑑𝜑
∞
𝜑 𝐻𝐹
− 𝛾𝐿𝐻𝑤𝐻
2−𝜍𝜏𝐻𝐹
1−𝜍  𝜑 𝐻𝐹
𝜍−2−𝛾
𝜕𝜑 𝐻𝐹
𝜕𝐿𝐻
 
− 𝛾  𝜑 𝐹𝐹
𝜍−2−𝛾
𝜕𝜑 𝐹𝐹
𝜕𝐿𝐻
                                                                          (71.2) 
We have already found the derivatives of the cut-offs as (59), (60), (63) and (64). The 
result of the integration has been found in the Chaney-section. 
 𝜑𝜍−2−𝛾𝑑𝜑
∞
𝜑 𝑖𝑗
=  
1
𝛾 − (𝜍 − 1)
 𝜑 𝑖𝑗
𝜍−1−𝛾           (72) 
We can insert from (72) and for all the limits into (71) and then from (71) into (70). 
There is not much point in doing that literally, since the resultant expression does not 
simplify much. It is better to analyse the results from the equations above. 
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7.3 Analysis 
I can predict with certainty the signs of the υ’s and their derivatives. Before I go 
further, I collect all these equations, and assume 𝑤𝑖 = 1 and symmetric trade costs 
 𝑓𝑖𝑗 = 𝑓𝑗𝑖 = 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟  , 𝑓𝑖𝑖 = 𝑓𝑗𝑗 = 𝑓𝑑𝑜𝑚  , 𝜏𝑖𝑗 = 𝜏𝑗𝑖 = 𝜏 
𝜑 𝑖𝑗 = 𝜆4 ×  𝐿𝑖 + 1 
1
𝛾 ×  
𝜏
𝜃𝑗
 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟
1
𝜍−1 
𝜑 𝑗𝑗  = 𝜆4 ×  𝐿𝑖 + 1 
1
𝛾 ×  
1
𝜃𝑗
 𝑓𝑑𝑜𝑚
1
𝜍−1 
𝜑 𝑖𝑖  = 𝜆4 ×  1 +
1
𝐿𝑖
 
1
𝛾
×  
1
𝜃𝑖
 𝑓𝑑𝑜𝑚
1
𝜍−1 
𝜑 𝑗𝑖  = 𝜆4 ×  1 +
1
𝐿𝑖
 
1
𝛾
×  
𝜏
𝜃𝑖
 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟
1
𝜍−1                                               
From the above we can see that 𝜑 𝑖𝑗 = 𝜏  
𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟
𝑓𝑑𝑜𝑚
 
1
𝜍−1
𝜑 𝑗𝑗  and 𝜑 𝑗𝑖 = 𝜏  
𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟
𝑓𝑑𝑜𝑚
 
1
𝜍−1
𝜑 𝑖𝑖 . We 
use our results to analyse the derivatives. With symmetric costs the structure 
simplifies and we have  
𝐵 = 𝐶 = 𝑓𝑑𝑜𝑚
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1
 and 𝐴 = 𝐷 = 𝜏−𝛾𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1
 . I insert for C and D 
∂𝜑 𝑖𝑗
∂𝐿𝑖
= 𝜑 𝑖𝑗
1
𝛾 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
 1 +
𝐴 − 𝐵
𝐿𝑖𝐴 + 𝐵
 > 0                                                        (59) 
∂𝜑 𝑗𝑗
∂𝐿𝑖
= 𝜑 𝑗𝑗
1
𝛾 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
 1 +
𝐴 − 𝐵
𝐿𝑖𝐴 + 𝐵
 > 0                                                        (60) 
∂𝜑 𝑖𝑖
∂𝐿𝑖
= −𝜑 𝑖𝑖
1
𝛾 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
 
1
𝐿𝑖
−
𝐵 − 𝐴
𝐿𝑖𝐵 + 𝐴
  < 0                                                  (63) 
∂𝜑 𝑗𝑖
∂𝐿𝑖
= −𝜑 𝑗𝑖  
1
𝛾 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
 
1
𝐿𝑖
−
𝐵 − 𝐴
𝐿𝑖𝐵 + 𝐴
 < 0                                                 (64) 
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We can see that 
∂𝜑 𝑖𝑗
∂𝐿𝑖
= 𝜏  
𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟
𝑓𝑑𝑜𝑚
 
1
𝜍−1 ∂𝜑 𝑗𝑗
∂𝐿𝑖
 and 
∂𝜑 𝑗𝑖
∂𝐿𝑖
= 𝜏  
𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟
𝑓𝑑𝑜𝑚
 
1
𝜍−1 ∂𝜑 𝑖𝑖
∂𝐿𝑖
. Below, I will 
insert this. 
We take one step up and inspect the price indices in a reduced version of (69): 
𝑃𝑖 =
𝜍
𝜍 − 1
 𝛾𝐿𝑖  𝜑
𝜍−2−𝛾𝑑𝜑
∞
𝜑 𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛾𝜏1−𝜍  𝜑𝜍−2−𝛾𝑑𝜑
∞
𝜑 𝑗𝑖
 
1  1−𝜍  
 
𝑃𝑗 =
𝜍
𝜍 − 1
 𝛾𝐿𝑖𝜏
1−𝜍  𝜑𝜍−2−𝛾𝑑𝜑
∞
𝜑 𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛾 𝜑𝜍−2−𝛾𝑑𝜑
∞
𝜑 𝑗𝑗
 
1  1−𝜍  
 
We are interested in the value in the brackets. In the case of symmetric costs, the 
largest country has the largest value in the brackets. We move to the derivatives from 
(70) inserted from (71) and rearrange: 
∂ …  𝑖
∂𝐿𝑖
= 𝛾𝜑 𝑖𝑖
𝜍−1−𝛾   
1
𝛾 − (𝜍 − 1)
 − 𝐿𝑖  
1
𝜑 𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜑 𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝐿𝑖
  − 𝛾𝜏1−𝜍  𝜑 𝑗𝑖
𝜍−2−𝛾
𝜕𝜑 𝑗𝑖
𝜕𝐿𝑖
  
∂ …  𝑗
∂𝐿𝑖
= 𝛾𝜑 𝑖𝑗
𝜍−1−𝛾𝜏1−𝜍   
1
𝛾 − (𝜍 − 1)
 − 𝐿𝑖  
1
𝜑 𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝜑 𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝐿𝑖
  − 𝛾  𝜑 𝑗𝑗
𝜍−2−𝛾
𝜕𝜑 𝑗𝑗
𝜕𝐿𝑖
  
I insert from the known relations between the limits and their derivatives, simplify 
and rearrange: 
∂ …  𝑖
∂𝐿𝑖
= 𝛾𝜑 𝑖𝑖
𝜍−1−𝛾   
1
𝛾 − (𝜍 − 1)
 −
1
𝜑 𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜑 𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝐿𝑖
 𝐿𝑖 + 𝜏
−𝛾  
𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟
𝑓𝑑𝑜𝑚
 
1−
𝛾
𝜍−1
   
∂ …  𝑗
∂𝐿𝑖
= 𝛾𝜏−𝛾  
𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟
𝑓𝑑𝑜𝑚
 
1−
𝛾
𝜍−1
𝜑 𝑗𝑗
𝜍−1−𝛾   
1
𝛾 − (𝜍 − 1)
 −
1
𝜑 𝑗𝑗
𝜕𝜑 𝑗𝑗
𝜕𝐿𝑖
 𝐿𝑖 + 𝜏
𝛾  
𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟
𝑓𝑑𝑜𝑚
 
𝛾
𝜍−1−1
   
Inserting for the derivatives, inserting A and B for trade costs and  rearranging: 
∂ …  𝑖
∂𝐿𝑖
= 𝛾𝜑 𝑖𝑖
𝜍−1−𝛾   
1
𝛾 − (𝜍 − 1)
 +
1
𝛾 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
 
1
𝐿𝑖
−
𝐵 − 𝐴
𝐿𝑖𝐵 + 𝐴
  𝐿𝑖 +
𝐴
𝐵
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∂ …  𝑗
∂𝐿𝑖
= 𝛾
𝐴
𝐵
𝜑 𝑗𝑗
𝜍−1−𝛾   
1
𝛾 − (𝜍 − 1)
 −
1
𝛾 𝐿𝑖 + 1 
 1 +
𝐴 − 𝐵
𝐿𝑖𝐴 + 𝐵
  𝐿𝑖 +
𝐵
𝐴
   
We can from direct inspection of the above say for sure that 
∂ …  𝑖
∂𝐿𝑖
> 1. 
I am not able to get any further algebraically. I am not sure what are reasonable 
values for the fixed costs. As we have normalised wages to unity, the fixed costs can 
be measured in labour units. As we also have normalised labour in country j to unity, 
fixed costs should be less than one. That means that what is larger of A and B 
depends on many parameters. Not that knowing that would make us able to say 
anything certain about 
∂ …  𝑗
∂𝐿𝑖
. 
I see no other solution than using numerical tests. No matter how hard I try, I am not 
able to produce a negative result. I am also not able to produce 
∂ …  𝑖
∂𝐿𝑖
<
∂ …  𝑗
∂𝐿𝑖
. 
Although I have not proven it, I take it for a somewhat sketchy result. Now we bring 
back (70). As we said above: for symmetric costs, the larger country will have the 
larger value inside the parentheses. 
∂𝑃𝐻
∂𝐿𝐻
=  
𝜍
𝜍 − 1
  
1
1 − 𝜍
  …  𝐻
𝜍
1−𝜍 ×
∂ …  𝐻
∂𝐿𝐻
                                                              (70.1) 
∂𝑃𝐹
∂𝐿𝐻
=  
𝜍
𝜍 − 1
  
1
1 − 𝜍
  …  𝐹
𝜍
1−𝜍 ×
∂ …  𝐹
∂𝐿𝐻
                                                             (70.2) 
The signs of this seem to be ok. 
∂𝑃𝐻
∂𝐿𝐻
< 0 ,
∂𝑃𝐹
∂𝐿𝐻
< 0 
Thus everyone will be better off. In the Krugman model with homogeneous good we 
got the somewhat surprising result that a country is indifferent to the size of the 
country it trades with. In the Chaney model, we see that a country benefits from 
having a large trading partner. 
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Sadly, numerical testing does not give clear results on which index is the most 
affected. All we can say is that if country H is smaller, equal or not too much greater 
than country F, we will have  
 
∂𝑃𝐻
∂𝐿𝐻
 >  
∂𝑃𝐹
∂𝐿𝐻
  
This will be fulfilled even for quite large size differences if the values of the other 
parameters are right. I believe the reason for having the opposite result comes from 
that if 𝑃𝐹 ≫ 𝑃𝐻  then the absolute change in the price index will be bigger, while the 
percentage change will not. Numerical tests support this. At every try I get 
∂𝑃𝐻
∂𝐿𝐻
∂𝑃𝐹
∂𝐿𝐻
×
𝑃𝐹
𝑃𝐻
> 1 
My conclusion is that the outcomes of this model points in the same general direction 
as of the Krugman model. The results from the Chaney model actually have more in 
common with the Krugman model without the homogeneous good. As for the 
economic interpretation of why the results differ, specifically why 
∂𝑃𝐹
∂𝐿𝐻
= 0 in 
Krugman, I am unable to produce a solid explanation. 
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8. Conclusions 
I follow up Chaney’s analysis of the gravity effect by transferring it to the two-
country case. My findings are that his results holds also in this case. For the n-country 
case, the Krugman model implies that the elasticity of substitution (σ) affects the 
elasticity of trade flows with respect to variable trade costs (ς) positively. Chaney 
finds that this effect is absent in his model. On the contrary, the elasticity of trade 
flows with respect to fixed trade costs (ξ) is affected negatively by σ. Thus the sum of 
this is that trade flows are affected negatively by σ, not positively as Krugman’s 
model implies. 
In the two-country case, the results are stronger. Here the Krugman model implies a 
positive relationship between σ and ς  while the Chaney model implies a negative. In 
addition, the effect on ξ is negative, and more so than in the n-country case. 
My next results come from analysing the home market effect in the model. I find that 
the effect is present, but is graphically visible only for the right parameter values. It 
thus seems to be rather week. The result I obtain is a non-linear relationship between 
the share of labour force and the share of production. For the symmetric case, the 
smaller country will produce a somewhat less than proportional share of the 
differentiated good. The non-linear shape still ensures that we never get full 
specialisation. This is caused by the productivity structure: there will always be a few 
firms productive enough to overcome the disadvantages of being located in the 
smaller market. 
Finally, I analyse the impact of a change in country size on the ideal price indices. As 
income per capita is constant, the impact on the price index can be seen as a proxy for 
the impact on utility. I derive how the gains from trade (as measured by the price 
index) depend on the size of the partner one trades with. 
For the Krugman model I find that a country benefits from getting bigger. Somewhat 
surprisingly I find that it if a homogeneous good is also traded, it matters not for a 
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country whether the trading partner is small or large. For the Chaney model the 
results are less clear, but a combination of algebra and numerical analysis using 
MATLAB indicates that a country gains from getting bigger, and that it also gains 
from having a larger trading partner. The results are not entirely clear on which 
country benefits the most in absolute terms, but it seems clear that the growing 
country will a larger percentagewise reduction in the price index. Paradoxically, the 
implications of the Chaney-model appear to have more in common with those derived 
from the Krugman-model without a homogeneous good, than those from the model 
with this good. 
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Appendix 
Gains from variety 
Consumers in both countries will have access to the sum of varieties 𝑛𝐻 + 𝑛𝐹. This 
obviously leads to gains from trade. This can be seen if we re-express (1) now that we 
know that in the absence of trade costs 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐  𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝 for all i. Utility and the budget 
constraint (assuming it binding) can be expressed as: 
𝑢 = 𝑛𝑐𝑖
(𝜍−1) 𝜍 
, 1 < 𝜍                                                                                     (1′)  
𝑛𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖 = 𝑤 
where n stands for all available varieties, i.e. 𝑛𝐾 in the autarky case, 𝑛𝐻 + 𝑛𝐹  in the 
trade case. Solving the constraint for 𝑐𝑖  and inserting into the utility function, we get 
𝑢 = 𝑛  
𝑤
𝑛𝑝𝑖
 
(𝜍−1) 𝜍 
= 𝑛1 𝜍  
𝑤
𝑝𝑖
 
(𝜍−1) 𝜍 
 
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑛
=
1
𝜍
𝑛 1−𝜍 𝜍  
𝑤
𝑝𝑖
 
(𝜍−1) 𝜍 
> 0 
while  
𝜕2𝑢
𝜕𝑛2
=
1 − 𝜍
𝜍2
𝑛 1−2𝜍 𝜍  
𝑤
𝑝𝑖
 
(𝜍−1) 𝜍 
< 0 
Marginal utility with respect to variety is positive and diminishing. 
From (5) we find 
𝜆 =
𝜍 − 1
𝜍𝑝𝑖
𝑐𝑖
−1 𝜍 
 
As 𝑐𝑖  is diminishing in n, marginal utility of income 𝜆 is increasing in n. 
64 
 
Solving for share of production Sn  
𝑥
𝜇
=
1
𝑛𝐻 + 𝑛𝐹𝜌
𝐿𝐻 +
𝜌
𝑛𝐹 + 𝑛𝐻𝜌
𝐿𝐹                                                                                      (25) 
𝑥
𝜇
=
1
𝑛𝐹 + 𝑛𝐻𝜌
𝐿𝐹 +
𝜌
𝑛𝐻 + 𝑛𝐹𝜌
𝐿𝐻                                                                                       (26) 
We start from  25 = (26) 
1
𝑛𝐻 + 𝑛𝐹𝜌
𝐿𝐻 +
𝜌
𝑛𝐹 + 𝑛𝐻𝜌
𝐿𝐹 =
1
𝑛𝐹 + 𝑛𝐻𝜌
𝐿𝐹 +
𝜌
𝑛𝐻 + 𝑛𝐹𝜌
𝐿𝐻  
1 − 𝜌
𝑛𝐻 + 𝑛𝐹𝜌
𝐿𝐻 =
1 − 𝜌
𝑛𝐹 + 𝑛𝐻𝜌
𝐿𝐹  
𝐿𝐻 𝑛𝐹 + 𝑛𝐻𝜌 = 𝐿𝐹 𝑛𝐻 + 𝑛𝐹𝜌  
𝑛𝐹 𝐿𝐻 − 𝐿𝐹𝜌 = 𝑛𝐻 𝐿𝐹 − 𝐿𝐻𝜌  
𝑛𝐻 = 𝑛𝐹
 𝐿𝐻 − 𝐿𝐹𝜌 
 𝐿𝐹 − 𝐿𝐻𝜌 
 
We define 
sn ≡
𝑛𝐻
𝑛𝐻 + 𝑛𝐹
=
𝑛𝐹
 𝐿𝐻 − 𝐿𝐹𝜌 
 𝐿𝐹 − 𝐿𝐻𝜌 
𝑛𝐹
 𝐿𝐻 − 𝐿𝐹𝜌 
 𝐿𝐹 − 𝐿𝐻𝜌 
+ 𝑛𝐹
=
𝐿𝐻 − 𝐿𝐹𝜌
𝐿𝐹 − 𝐿𝐻𝜌
𝐿𝐻 − 𝐿𝐹𝜌
𝐿𝐹 − 𝐿𝐻𝜌
+
𝐿𝐹 − 𝐿𝐻𝜌
𝐿𝐹 − 𝐿𝐻𝜌
 
=
𝐿𝐻 − 𝐿𝐹𝜌
𝐿𝐻 − 𝐿𝐹𝜌 + 𝐿𝐹 − 𝐿𝐻𝜌
=
𝐿𝐻 − 𝐿𝐹𝜌
 1 − ρ  𝐿𝐻 + 𝐿𝐹 
=
1
 1 − ρ 
 
𝐿𝐻
𝐿𝐻 + 𝐿𝐹
− 𝜌
𝐿𝐹
𝐿𝐻 + 𝐿𝐹
  
sn =
1
 1 − ρ 
 sL − 𝜌 1 − sL  =
1
 1 − ρ 
  1 + ρ sL − 𝜌                                  (27) 
where  
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sL =
𝐿𝐻
𝐿𝐻 + 𝐿𝐹
 
Derivations from Chaney section II 
Productivity threshold:  
Exporters are only the most efficient of domestic firms. 
Price of good 𝜑 from country i in country j: 
𝑝𝑖𝑗  𝜑 = 𝜍/ 𝜍 − 1 𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗 /𝜑 
Quantity consumed of the same: 
𝑞𝑖𝑗  𝜑 = 𝜇
𝑝𝑖𝑗  𝜑 
−𝜍
𝑃𝑗
1−𝜍 𝑌𝑗  
And comparing 
𝜋𝑖𝑗  𝜑 =  𝑝𝑖𝑗  𝜑 − 𝑐𝑖𝑗  𝜑  𝑞𝑖𝑗  𝜑 − 𝑓𝑖𝑗  
with    𝑐𝑖𝑗  𝑞 =
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜑
𝑞 + 𝑓𝑖𝑗  
we see that  𝑐𝑖𝑗 ,𝜑  𝑞 = 𝑐𝑖𝑗  𝜑 𝑞𝑖𝑗  𝜑 + 𝑓𝑖𝑗 =
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜑
𝑞𝑖𝑗  𝜑 + 𝑓𝑖𝑗  
and thus 𝑐𝑖𝑗  𝜑 =
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜑
 
𝜋𝑖𝑗  𝜑 =  𝑝𝑖𝑗  𝜑 −
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜑
 𝑞𝑖𝑗  𝜑 − 𝑓𝑖𝑗  
Inserting for 𝑝𝑖𝑗  𝜑  and 𝑞𝑖𝑗  𝜑 : 
𝜋𝑖𝑗  𝜑 =  𝜍/ 𝜍 − 1 
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜑
−
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜑
 𝜇
 𝜍/ 𝜍 − 1 𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗 /𝜑 
−𝜍
𝑃𝑗
1−𝜍 𝑌𝑗 − 𝑓𝑖𝑗  
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𝜋𝑖𝑗  𝜑 = 𝜇𝑌𝑗  1 −  𝜍 − 1 /𝜍 
 𝜍/ 𝜍 − 1 𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗 /𝜑 
1−𝜍
𝑃𝑗
1−𝜍 − 𝑓𝑖𝑗  
Profits for firm 𝜑 exporting from country i in country j: 
𝜋𝑖𝑗  𝜑 =
𝜇𝑌𝑗
𝜍
 𝜍/ 𝜍 − 1 𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗 /𝜑 
1−𝜍
𝑃𝑗
1−𝜍 − 𝑓𝑖𝑗  
 
We find the threshold 𝜑 𝑖𝑗  for exporting firms from 𝜋𝑖𝑗  𝜑 = 0: 
𝜇𝑌𝑗
𝜍
 𝜍/ 𝜍 − 1 𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗 /𝜑 
1−𝜍
𝑃𝑗
1−𝜍 − 𝑓𝑖𝑗 = 0 
𝜑 =  
𝜍
𝜇
 
1  𝜍−1  𝜍
 𝜍 − 1 
 
𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑌𝑗
 
1  𝜍−1  
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝑃𝑗
 
𝜑 𝑖𝑗  = 𝜆1  
𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑌𝑗
 
1  𝜍−1  
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝑃𝑗
                                                        (34) 
where 
𝜆1 =  
𝜍
𝜇
 
1  𝜍−1  𝜍
 𝜍 − 1 
 
 
Equilibrium Price Indices for the differentiated good: 
 We start with (32): 
𝑃𝑗 =   𝑤𝑘𝐿𝑘   
𝜍
𝜍 − 1
𝑤𝑘𝜏𝑘𝑗
𝜑
 
1−𝜍∞
𝜑 𝑘𝑗
2
𝑘=1
𝑑𝐺(𝜑) 
1 (1−𝜍) 
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From (30) we see that   
𝑑𝐺 𝜑 
𝑑𝜑
=
𝑑 1 − 𝜑−𝛾  
𝑑𝜑
= 𝛾𝜑−𝛾−1 → 𝑑𝐺 𝜑 = 𝛾𝜑−𝛾−1𝑑𝜑 
𝑃𝑗 =   𝑤𝑘𝐿𝑘
2
𝑘=1
  
𝜍
𝜍 − 1
𝑤𝑘𝜏𝑘𝑗
𝜑
 
1−𝜍∞
𝜑 𝑘𝑗
𝛾𝜑−𝛾−1𝑑𝜑 
1 (1−𝜍 ) 
  𝑘 = 1,2   , 𝑗 = 1,2 
We take out of the integrand everything that does not concern 𝜑 
𝑃𝑗 =
𝜍
𝜍 − 1
 𝛾 𝑤𝑘𝐿𝑘 𝑤𝑘𝜏𝑘𝑗  
1−𝜍
 𝜑𝜍−2−𝛾𝑑𝜑
∞
𝜑 𝑘𝑗
2
𝑘=1
 
1  1−𝜍  
                              (68) 
𝑃𝑗 =
𝜍
𝜍 − 1
 𝛾 𝑤𝑘𝐿𝑘 𝑤𝑘𝜏𝑘𝑗  
1−𝜍
 
𝜑𝜍−1−𝛾
(𝜍 − 1 − 𝛾)
𝜑 𝑖𝑗
∞
 
2
𝑘=1
 
1 (1−𝜍 ) 
 
If 
𝜑𝜍−1−𝛾
(𝜍−1−𝛾)
= 𝐹 𝜑  then 
𝑃𝑗 =
𝜍
𝜍 − 1
 𝛾 𝑤𝑘𝐿𝑘 𝑤𝑘𝜏𝑘𝑗  
1−𝜍
 𝐹 ∞ − 𝐹(𝜑 𝑖𝑗 ) 
2
𝑘=1
 
1 (1−𝜍) 
 
As we have assumed 𝛾 > 𝜍 − 1 we get lim𝜑→∞
𝜑𝜍−1−𝛾
(𝜍−1−𝛾)
= 0 
Therefore, inserting for 𝜑 𝑖𝑗  from (34) we get 
𝑃𝑗
=
𝜍
𝜍 − 1
 𝛾  𝑤𝑘𝐿𝑘 𝑤𝑘𝜏𝑘𝑗  
1−𝜍
 −
1
(𝜍 − 1 − 𝛾)
  𝜆1  
𝑓𝑘𝑗
𝑌𝑗
 
1  𝜍−1  
𝑤𝑘𝜏𝑘𝑗
𝑃𝑗
 
𝜍−1−𝛾2
𝑘=1
 
1 (1−𝜍) 
 
Inserting for 𝜆1 and rearranging 
𝑃𝑗 =  
𝛾 − (𝜍 − 1)
𝛾
 
1
𝛾
 
𝜍
𝜇
 
1
𝜍−1
−
1
𝛾
 
𝜍
𝜍 − 1
 𝑌𝑗
1
𝛾
−
1
𝜍−1  𝑤𝑘𝐿𝑘 𝑤𝑘𝜏𝑘𝑗  
−𝛾
𝑓𝑘𝑗
 𝜍−1−𝛾 
 𝜍−1 
2
𝑘=1
 
−
1
𝛾
 
We know that  
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𝑌𝑘 =  1 + 𝜋 𝑤𝑘𝐿𝑘  →    𝑤𝑘𝐿𝑘 =
𝑌𝑘
 1 + 𝜋 
 
Inserting and rearranging 
𝑃𝑗 =  
𝛾 − (𝜍 − 1)
𝛾
 
1
𝛾
 
𝜍
𝜇
 
1
𝜍−1−
1
𝛾
 
𝜍
𝜍 − 1
  
1 + 𝜋
𝑌
 
1
𝛾
× 𝑌𝑗
1
𝛾−
1
𝜍−1  
𝑌𝑘
𝑌
 𝑤𝑘𝜏𝑘𝑗  
−𝛾
𝑓𝑘𝑗
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1 
2
𝑘=1
 
−
1
𝛾
 
𝑃𝑗 = 𝜆2 × 𝑌𝑗
1 𝛾 −1 (𝜍−1) 
× 𝜃𝑗         (35) 
Where  𝜆2 =  
𝛾− 𝜍−1  
𝛾
 
1
𝛾
 
𝜍
𝜇
 
1  𝜍−1  −1 𝛾 
 
𝜍
𝜍−1
  
1+𝜋
𝑌
 
1
𝛾
 
and   𝜃𝑗 ≡   
𝑌𝑘
𝑌
 𝑤𝑘𝜏𝑘𝑗  
−𝛾
𝑓𝑘𝑗
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1
 2
𝑘=1  
−
1
𝛾
 
𝜋 is dividend per share and Y is world output. 𝜃𝑗  is a weighted average of bilateral 
trade barriers to j. 
Equilibrium Exports, Thresholds and Profits:  
To find exports I insert from (35) and for 𝑝𝑖𝑗  into (31): 
𝑥𝑖𝑗  𝜑 = 𝜇𝑌𝑗
 
 
 
 𝜍/ 𝜍 − 1 𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗 /𝜑
 
𝛾 −  𝜍 − 1  
𝛾  
1
𝛾
 
𝜍
𝜇 
1
𝜍−1
−
1
𝛾
 
𝜍
𝜍 − 1  
1 + 𝜋
𝑌  
1
𝛾
𝑌
𝑗
1
𝛾
−
1
𝜍−1𝜃𝑗 
 
 
 
1−𝜍
 
𝑥𝑖𝑗  𝜑 = 𝜆3 ×  
𝑌𝑗
𝑌
 
𝜍−1
𝛾
 
𝜃𝑗
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
 
𝜍−1
𝜑𝜍−1 , 𝑖𝑓 𝜑 > 𝜑 𝑖𝑗  
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𝜆3 = 𝜍𝜆4
1−𝜍 , 𝜆4 =   
𝜍
𝜇
  
𝛾 
𝛾 −  𝜍 − 1 
  
1
 1 + 𝜋 
  
1
𝛾
 
To find productivity threshold I enter (35) into (34): 
𝜑 𝑖𝑗  = 𝜆1  
𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑌𝑗
 
1
𝜍−1 𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
 
𝛾 −  𝜍 − 1  
𝛾  
1
𝛾
 
𝜍
𝜇 
1
𝜍−1−
1
𝛾
 
𝜍
𝜍 − 1  
1 + 𝜋
𝑌  
1
𝛾
𝑌
𝑗
1
𝛾
−
1
𝜍−1𝜃𝑗  
 
After some tedious rearrangement: 
𝜑 𝑖𝑗  = 𝜆4 ×  
𝑌
𝑌𝑗
 
1
𝛾
×  
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
 × 𝑓𝑖𝑗
1
𝜍−1 
𝜆4  =   
𝜍
𝜇
  
𝛾 
𝛾 −  𝜍 − 1 
  
1
1 + 𝜋
  
1
𝛾
 
Aggregate output in country i, is by definition: 
𝑌𝑖 ≡  1 + 𝜋 𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖                                                                                               (38) 
The dividends per share can be found as
4
. 
𝜋 =
 
𝜍 − 1
𝛾  
𝜇
𝜍
1 −  
𝜍 − 1
𝛾  
𝜇
𝜍
 
In summary:     
𝑥𝑖𝑗  𝜑|𝜑 > 𝜑 𝑖𝑗  = 𝜆3 ×  
𝑌𝑗
𝑌
 
𝜍−1
𝛾
 
𝜃𝑗
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
 
𝜍−1
𝜑𝜍−1                  (36) 
                                              
4
 To find this is a complecated procedure that can be found for instance in appendix 
8.3 of the working paper ”The Margins of Multinational Production and the Role 
of Intra-Firm Trade” by Irarrazabal, Moxnes and Opromolla (2008). Unfortunately, I did not have 
time to transfer this derivation into the framework and the notation of the Chaney model. 
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𝜑 𝑖𝑗  = 𝜆4 ×  
𝑌
𝑌𝑗
 
1
𝛾
×  
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
 × 𝑓𝑖𝑗
1
𝜍−1       (37) 
𝑌𝑖 =  1 + 𝜋 𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖                   (38) 
𝜋 =
 
𝜍−1
𝛾
 
𝜇
𝜍
1− 
𝜍−1
𝛾
 
𝜇
𝜍
                          (39) 
𝜆3 = 𝜍𝜆4
1−𝜍 , 𝜆4 =   
𝜍
𝜇
  
𝛾 
𝛾 −  𝜍 − 1 
  
1
 1 + 𝜋 
  
1
𝛾
 
𝜃𝑗 ≡  
𝑌𝑘
𝑌
 𝑤𝑘𝜏𝑘𝑗  
−𝛾
𝑓𝑘𝑗
 1−
𝛾
𝜍−1 
2
𝑘=1
 
−
1
𝛾
 
 
Aggregate Trade:  
To find an expression for aggregate trade in differentiated goods from country i to 
country j, I start with 
𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖  𝑥𝑖𝑗  𝜑 𝑑𝐺(𝜑)
∞
𝜑 𝑖𝑗  
                                                                              (41) 
Inserting (36) we get  
𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖  𝜆3 ×  
𝑌𝑗
𝑌
 
𝜍−1
𝛾
 
𝜃𝑗
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
 
𝜍−1
𝜑𝜍−1𝑑𝐺(𝜑)
∞
𝜑 𝑖𝑗  
 
From (30) we see that   
𝑑𝐺 𝜑 
𝑑𝜑
=
𝑑 1 − 𝜑−𝛾  
𝑑𝜑
= 𝛾𝜑−𝛾−1 → 𝑑𝐺 𝜑 = 𝛾𝜑−𝛾−1𝑑𝜑 
𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖  𝜆3 ×  
𝑌𝑗
𝑌
 
𝜍−1
𝛾
 
𝜃𝑗
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
 
𝜍−1
𝜑𝜍−1𝛾𝜑−𝛾−1𝑑𝜑
∞
𝜑 𝑖𝑗  
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We take out of the integrand everything that does not concern 𝜑 
𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖𝜆3  
𝑌𝑗
𝑌
 
𝜍−1
𝛾
 
𝜃𝑗
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
 
𝜍−1
 𝜑𝜍−2−𝛾𝑑𝜑
∞
𝜑 𝑖𝑗  
 
𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖𝜆3  
𝑌𝑗
𝑌
 
𝜍−1
𝛾
 
𝜃𝑗
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
 
𝜍−1
 
𝜑𝜍−1−𝛾
(𝜍 − 1 − 𝛾)
𝜑 𝑖𝑗
∞
  
 
If 
𝜑𝜍−1−𝛾
(𝜍−1−𝛾)
= 𝐹 𝜑  then 
𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖𝜆3  
𝑌𝑗
𝑌
 
𝜍−1
𝛾
 
𝜃𝑗
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
 
𝜍−1
 𝐹 ∞ − 𝐹(𝜑 𝑖𝑗 )  
As we have assumed 𝛾 > 𝜍 − 1  𝑤𝑒 𝑔𝑒𝑡 lim𝜑→∞
𝜑𝜍−1−𝛾
(𝜍−1−𝛾)
= 0 
Therefore, inserting for 𝜑 𝑖𝑗  from (37) we get 
𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖𝜆3  
𝑌𝑗
𝑌
 
𝜍−1
𝛾
 
𝜃𝑗
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
 
𝜍−1
 −
1
(𝜍 − 1 − 𝛾)
  𝜆4 ×  
𝑌
𝑌𝑗
 
1
𝛾
×  
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
 × 𝑓𝑖𝑗
1
𝜍−1 
𝜍−1−𝛾
   (43) 
𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾𝜆3𝜆4
𝜍−1−𝛾 1
𝛾 − (𝜍 − 1)
×
𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖𝑌𝑗
𝑌
 
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
 
−𝛾
𝑓𝑖𝑗
− 
𝛾
𝜍−1
−1  
The constant term simplifies: 
𝛾𝜆3𝜆4
𝜍−1−𝛾 1
𝛾 − (𝜍 − 1)
= 𝛾𝜍𝜆4
1−𝜍𝜆4
𝜍−1−𝛾 1
𝛾 − (𝜍 − 1)
= 𝛾𝜍𝜆4
−𝛾 1
𝛾 − (𝜍 − 1)
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= 𝛾𝜍   
𝜍
𝜇
  
𝛾 
𝛾 −  𝜍 − 1 
  
1
 1 + 𝜋 
  
−1 1
𝛾 − (𝜍 − 1)
= 𝛾𝜍  
𝜇
𝜍
  
𝛾 −  𝜍 − 1  
𝛾
  1 + 𝜋 
1
𝛾 − (𝜍 − 1)
 
=  1 + 𝜋 𝜇 
We know that    𝑌𝑖 =  1 + 𝜋 𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖   so  1 + 𝜋 𝜇 =
𝑌𝑖
𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖
𝜇 
𝑋𝑖𝑗 =
𝑌𝑖
𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖
𝜇 ×
𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖𝑌𝑗
𝑌
 
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
 
−𝛾
𝑓𝑖𝑗
− 
𝛾
𝜍−1
−1  
We finally get 
Proposition 1: Total exports (free on board) 𝑋𝑖𝑗 from country i to country j are given 
by: 
𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝜇 ×
𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗
𝑌
 
𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜃𝑗
 
−𝛾
𝑓𝑖𝑗
− 
𝛾
𝜍−1
−1                                                                                (40) 
 
 
 
 
 
